This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2013-03-20 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, petitioners' reliance on Sections 40[59] and 41[60] of Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure is, at the very least, misplaced. Inasmuch as possession must be adverse, public, peaceful and uninterrupted in order to consolidate prescription, it stands to reason that acts of a possessory character done by virtue of a license or mere tolerance on the part of the real owner are not sufficient.[61] It has been ruled that this principle is applicable not only with respect to the prescription of the dominium as a whole, but, to the prescription of right in rem.[62] Considering that Article 1119 of the present Civil Code also provides that "(a)cts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purposes of possession," the error petitioners impute against the CA for applying the new Civil Code provisions on prescription is more apparent than real. Then as now, possession must be en concepto de dueño or adverse in order to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right. If not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.[63] | |||||
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2011-12-14 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the property in question, petitioners acknowledged ownership thereof by the immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is clearly shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it contains a statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the land of Vicente, respondents' immediate predecessor-in- interest.[21] Petitioners never disputed such an acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge that they nor their predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed lot, petitioners' possession could not be deemed as possession in good faith as to enable them to acquire the subject land by ordinary prescription. In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' possession of the lot in question was by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription.[22] Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueño, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.[23] | |||||
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2010-10-20 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Assuming that the subject land may be acquired by prescription, we cannot accept petitioners' claim of acquisition by prescription. Petitioners admitted that they had occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof. Having made this admission, they cannot claim that they have acquired the property by prescription unless they can prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that possession, in order to ripen into ownership, must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not in the concept of owner, such as the one claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long performed, do not start the running of the period of prescription.[68] | |||||
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2009-03-20 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| This Court has held that two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related subject matters must be ordered consolidated and jointly tried in the court where the earlier case was filed.[39] This is consistent with Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which provides as follows:Section 1. Consolidation. - When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. | |||||