This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2010-03-26 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Moreover, the mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the exclusion of others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition.[36] While the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare.[37] In the present case, the unregulated disposal and sale of scrap ACSR wires will hamper the government's effort of curtailing the pernicious practice of trafficking stolen government property. This is an evil sought to be prevented by RA 7832 and certainly, it was well within the authority of the NPC to prescribe conditions in order to prevent it. | |||||
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2007-10-09 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some form of regulation for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over business interests.[90] In Pest Management Association of the Philippines v. Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority,[91] it was held thus: x x x Furthermore, as held in Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, despite the fact that "our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare." There can be no question that the unregulated use or proliferation of pesticides would be hazardous to our environment. Thus, in the aforecited case, the Court declared that "free enterprise does not call for removal of 'protective regulations'." x x x It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied] In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers' participation in any policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women and children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support and logistics or training (Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the proscribed activities are indispensable to the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being in restraint of trade. | |||||