This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2010-02-24 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita,[13] the Court reiterated: x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.[14] (emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2009-04-29 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained undisturbed since 1978, petitioner asserts that his utterances must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil the State has a right and duty to prevent and such danger must be grave and imminent.[45] | |||||
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2009-04-29 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| (A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS; (B) BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH; (C) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW; (D) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION; AND (E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.[10] In G.R. No. 165636, petitioner relies on the following grounds:SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION x x x CONSIDERING THAT: | |||||
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2008-02-15 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| Indeed, we have not wavered in the duty to uphold this cherished freedom. We have struck down laws and issuances meant to curtail this right, as in Adiong v. COMELEC,[1] Burgos v. Chief of Staff,[2] Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC,[3] and Bayan v. Executive Secretary Ermita.[4] When on its face, it is clear that a governmental act is nothing more than a naked means to prevent the free exercise of speech, it must be nullified. | |||||
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2008-02-15 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| Respondents[16] denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned petitioner's legal standing to file the petition. Among the arguments they raised as to the validity of the "fair warning" issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTC's mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry.[17] It was also stressed that "most of the [television] and radio stations continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP."[18] | |||||