This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2014-10-22 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| What can be gathered from the report of the Legal Services Division was that the land owned by the petitioner and covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 was the Sumapang Matanda property under TCT No. 103697. As to the Dakila property, we can only infer from the report that it was merely subdivided. The report did not mention whatsoever the agricultural activities performed in the Dakila property. Nor was there a finding that the Dakila property was devoted to either rice or corn cultivation as to justify its coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27. Such a finding was necessary, for the Court has observed in Solmayor v. Arroyo:[64] | |||||
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2013-01-23 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| It is well settled that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised.[36] This Court, in numerous instances, has had occasion to explain that it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[37] As a rule, the Court respects the factual findings of the CA and of quasi-judicial agencies like the DAR, giving them a certain measure of finality.[38] There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the findings of fact are conflicting. | |||||
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2012-09-05 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| From respondents' declarations, we find that no tenancy relations existed between them and petitioners, and neither was there any proof that they were the tenants of the late Mariano Antioquia, Sr. A tenant has been defined under Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 1199 as a person who, himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold system.[12] Thus, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.[13] | |||||
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2009-08-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In Solmayor v. Arroyo,[64] we declared: Well settled is the principle that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts. Accordingly, since specialized government agencies tasked to determine the classification of parcels of land, such as the Bureau of Soils and the HLURB, among other agencies, have already certified that the subject land is residential/commercial, the Court must accord such conclusions great respect, if not finality, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.[65] | |||||
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2008-07-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| All the requisites[46] must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal to petitioners' cause. It cannot even make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant.[47] This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.[48] | |||||
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2006-10-23 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| After reviewing the records of this case, the Court resolves to give due course to the case in order to put to rest the issues herein presented, specially in light of the Court's ruling in Solmayor v. Arroyo,[26] to wit: Furthermore, we must bear in mind that procedural rules are intended to ensure the proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. Moreover, we cannot shy away from our constitutionally mandated duty to questions of law set forth in this petition which hinges on the determination of the rights of herein litigants in the light of a very important piece of social legislation, Presidential Decree No. 27, which aims for the equitable distribution and ownership of land, without disregarding the property rights of landowners. Thus, for pragmatic reasons and consideration of justice and equity, the Court must put to rest the issues presented before us. (Emphasis supplied) If the Court sustains the CA Decision, which affirmed the RTC Decision, petitioners will be left holding an empty bag, so to speak. It should be noted that the property subject of this case has already been distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries way back in 1972, and up to now, 34 years later, petitioners have yet to enjoy the fruits of its value. Moreover, petitioners will be left without any recourse as regards the resolution of the issue of just compensation since both the RTC and the DARAB already dismissed the separate complaints for just compensation filed before them. Indeed, the "Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice requires it because what should guide judicial action is that a party is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose life, honor, or property on mere technicalities."[27] | |||||