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REPUBLIC v. CARLITO LACAP

This case has been cited 12 times or more.

2014-02-18
VELASCO JR., J.
children. Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.[16] Respondent's position that the court can order the minors to
2013-04-11
SERENO, C.J.
A rule of thumb for every petition brought under Rule 65 is the unavailability of an appeal or any "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy."[34] Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are extraordinary remedies that historically require extraordinary facts to be shown[35] in order to correct errors of jurisdiction.[36] The law also dictates the necessary steps before an extraordinary remedy may be issued.[37] To be sure, the availability of other remedies does not always lend itself to the impropriety of a Rule 65 petition.[38] If, for instance, the remedy is insufficient or would be proven useless,[39] then the petition will be given due course.[40]
2013-01-14
BERSAMIN, J.
It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative concern should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative processes. The issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency the opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due deliberation.[16] The court of law must allow the administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge its responsibilities within the specialized areas of its competence.[17]  This rests on the theory that the administrative authority is in a better position to resolve questions addressed to its particular expertise, and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so.[18]
2012-04-25
MENDOZA, J.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.[42]  It has been held, however, that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules.  In the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap,[43] the Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.[44] [Underscoring supplied]
2012-04-18
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In the case of Republic v. Lacap,[12] we expounded on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the related doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this wise: The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
2011-01-18
SERENO, J.
Firstly, petitioners claim that the Complaint filed by respondent before the Regional Trial Court was done without exhausting administrative remedies. Petitioners aver that respondent should have first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) before going to the courts. However, it has been established that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, [9] this Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case, conditions (c) and (e) are present.
2010-07-29
VELASCO JR., J.
As may be deduced from the above provisos, the DOTC, within the period fixed therein, may, on appeal or motu proprio, review the LTFRB's rulings. While not expressly stated in Sec. 6 of EO 202, the DOTC Secretary's decision may, in turn, be further appealed to the OP.  The "plain meaning" or verba legis rule dictates that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.[21]  Thus, the LTFRB rulings are not directly appealable to the CA under Rule 43.
2010-07-02
PERALTA, J.
Above all else, this Court still upholds the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. As enunciated in Republic v. Lacap:[50]
2010-04-23
MENDOZA, J.
Thus, we reject petitioner's argument that the CA erred when it acted upon the erroneous remedy availed of by respondent when he filed a petition for review considering that the assailed decision is not in the nature of "awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions" as prescribed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. While Sections 71 and 72 of Rule V (B) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service [27] provide for the remedy of an appeal from decisions of its regional offices to the Commission proper, Magnaye's petition to the CA comes under the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The CA correctly cited Republic v. Lacap, [28] where a violation of due process is listed to be among the noted exceptions to the rule. As discussed above, Magnaye's dismissal was tainted with irregularity because the notice given to him comes short of the notice contemplated by law and jurisprudence. The CA correctly exercised jurisdiction over this case where standards of due process had been patently breached.
2009-06-05
NACHURA, J.
It must first be stressed that petitioners failed to appeal the decision of the ASB to the Commission on Audit Proper before filing the instant petition with this Court, in derogation of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes.  The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.[8]
2009-04-02
CARPIO, J.
"Higher education," however, is defined as "education beyond the secondary level"[25] or "education provided by a college or university."[26] Under the "plain meaning" or verba legis rule in statutory construction, if the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.[27] The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.[28] Hence, the term "higher education" should be taken in its ordinary sense and should be read and interpreted together with the phrase "degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private." Higher education should be taken to mean tertiary education or that which grants a degree after its completion.
2008-03-03
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which is based on sound public policy and practical consideration, is not inflexible. There are instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; 2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 4) where the amount involved is relatively small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the question raised is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; 6) where judicial intervention is urgent; 7) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage; 8) where the controverted acts violate due process; 9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; 10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 11) when strong public interest is involved; and 13) in quo warranto proceedings.[23]