This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2010-02-24 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel aggression.[36] | |||||
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2008-10-17 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| It is important to note that accused-appellant admitted stabbing the victim but claimed that he did it in self-defense. When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was legally justified.[10] Thus, the accused must prove these requisites for self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and (3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel aggression.[11] | |||||
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2007-09-14 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression by the victim is a primordial element of self-defense; without it, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.[22] To be appreciated, the unlawful aggression must be a continuing circumstance or must have been existing at the time the defense is made.[23] A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased.[24] In this case, the trial and appellate courts correctly held that while Serafin initially attacked petitioner with a bolo, the unlawful aggression already ceased when the latter was able to go inside his brother's house and the former ran away. At this point, there was no longer any danger on his life; thus, there was also no necessity to "defend" himself by pursuing and attacking Serafin. | |||||
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2007-07-30 |
TINGA, J. |
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| All the prosecution's witnesses to the buy-bust operation consistently and unequivocally narrated the events that transpired during the operation, particularly the delivery by the accused of the plastic sachet to PO1 Memoracion upon payment by the latter of the agreed amount. The testimonies with respect to the discovery of the marked money were likewise straightforward and definite.[24] At this point, we reiterate the time-honored principle that factual findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of the witnesses, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive unless circumstances are present that would show that the lower courts have overlooked, misunderstood, or misconstrued cogent facts that may alter the outcome of the case.[25] Indeed, these testimonies are worthy of credence as police officers involved in buy-bust operations are presumed to have performed their duties regularly. This presumption can only be overcome through clear and convincing evidence that shows either of two things: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper motive.[26] There was absolutely no showing that either of these conditions obtains in the case at bar. | |||||
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2007-06-08 |
TINGA, J. |
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| defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense.[15] Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that he had indeed acted in self-defense in stabbing Romeo. This issue involves a question of fact properly evaluated by the trial court.[16] Unless the records show that certain facts have been overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the case, this Court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts.[17] After a thorough review of the records, we do not find any justification to modify the lower court's findings. | |||||