This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2015-01-14 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| The issue raised by petitioner is essentially factual in nature, the determination of which is best left to the courts below. Well settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.[23] The function of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.[24] As a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts, more so, when as here, such findings are undisturbed by the appellate court.[25] Stated otherwise, the Court refrains from further scrutiny of factual findings of trial courts, more so when those findings are affirmed by the CA. To do otherwise would defeat the very essence of Rule 45 and would convert the Court into a trier of facts, which is not meant to be. Certainly the rule admits exceptions[26] none, however, is applicable to the case at bar. Absent any application of any of the recognized exceptions, this Court is bound by the findings of fact by the lower courts.[27] | |||||
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2008-07-31 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| A cursory reading of the issues reveals that these are factual matters which are not within the province of the Court to look into, save only in exceptional circumstances which are not present in the case at bar. Well settled is the rule that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law must be raised.[5] As a matter of procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts, especially when, as in the case at bar, such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. This factual determination, as a matter of long and sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal. It is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of the factual holding of the lower courts.[6] | |||||
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2008-07-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| First. The CA was correct in upholding the finding of the trial court that the purported sale of the property from Capistrano to Scott was a forgery, and resort to a handwriting expert was not even necessary as the specimen signature submitted by Capistrano during trial showed marked variance from that found in the deed of absolute sale. The technical procedure utilized by handwriting experts, while usually helpful in the examination of forged documents, is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or comparison of handwritings.[5] | |||||