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JAMES MIRASOL v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

2014-11-26
BERSAMIN, J.
It is relevant to mention that the access fence was put up pursuant to Republic Act No. 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act), the enforcement of which was under the authority of the DOTC. Clarifying the DOTC's jurisdiction under this law in Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways,[24] the Court has said
2013-12-03
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and property for public welfare.[58] The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be reasonable, not oppressive.[59] In other words, to be a valid exercise of police power, it must have a lawful subject or objective and a lawful method of accomplishing the goal.[60] Under the police power of the State, "property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government."[61] The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare [as long as] the interference [is] reasonable and not arbitrary."[62] Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate private property for public use.[63] The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall not be taken without due process of law and the payment of just compensation.[64]
2010-09-15
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Administrative issuances have the force and effect of law.[32]  They benefit from the same presumption of validity and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes.  These two precepts place a heavy burden upon any party assailing governmental regulations.[33]  Petitioner's plain allegations are simply not enough to overcome the presumption of validity and reasonableness of the subject imposition.
2009-12-03
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.[20] As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,[21] "xxx a person's right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court's sound discretion." [22]
2009-12-01
NACHURA, J.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways,[31] a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal--a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
2009-11-20
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In fact, this Court, when it rendered the Decision it merely recognized that the questioned proclamation came from a co-equal branch of government, which entitled it to a strong presumption of constitutionality.[37] The presumption of its constitutionality stands inasmuch as the parties in the instant cases did not question its validity, much less present any evidence to prove that the same is unconstitutional. This is in line with the precept that administrative issuances have the force and effect of law and that they benefit from the same presumption of validity and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes.[38]
2007-10-15
CARPIO MORALES, J.
First. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.[29]  The burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a law rests on the party assailing the law.[30]  In passing upon the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government, courts must ever be mindful of the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid.
2007-01-29
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
To repeat, the purpose of the writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the court could hear the merits of the case.[31] The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status that preceded the controversy[32] which, in the instant case, is the holding of the annual stockholders' meeting on March 1, 2004 and the ensuing election of the directors and officers of STRADEC. But instead of preserving the status quo, Judge Emuslan's Order messed it up when, in compliance therewith, a special stockholders' meeting was held anew and a new set of directors and officers of STRADEC was elected. That effectively resolved respondents' principal action without even a full-blown trial on the merits since the Order impliedly ruled that the March 1, 2004 annual stockholders' meeting and election are void. Verily, the issuance of the questioned Order violates the established principle that courts should avoid granting a writ of preliminary injunction that would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.[33]