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SPS. PONCIANO AYA-AY v. ARPAPHIL SHIPPING CORP.

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 198097 2014-07-30	STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION v. SPS. MARGARITO B. DELALAMON AND PRISCILA A. DELALAMON REYES, J.
These rules, however, cannot be asserted perfunctorily by the claimant as it is incumbent upon him to prove, by substantial evidence, as to how and why the nature of his work and working conditions contributed to and/or aggravated his illness.[39] The respondents failed to discharge this burden of proof.
	GR No. 200837 2013-06-05	MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING INC. v. NELSON E. MESINA REYES, J.
Concomitant with such presumption is the burden placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his working conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease.[30] Substantial evidence consists of such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion that there is a causal connection between the nature of his employment and his illness, or that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions.[31] Only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease.[32]
	GR No. 188637 2010-12-15	ARNALDO G. GABUNAS v. SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES INC. SERENO, J.
In Spouses Ponciano Aya-ay, Sr. and Clemencia Aya-ay v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp. and Magna Marina, Inc.,[30] the issue resolved by the Court was whether the petitioners therein were entitled to death benefits provided under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Parenthetically, it was crucial to determine whether the death of the deceased was reasonably connected with his work, or whether the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease that resulted in the employee's death. In resolving the issue, the Court made this pronouncement: Hence, it was incumbent on petitioners to present substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, that the eye injury sustained by Aya-ay during the term of his employment with respondents caused, or increased the risk of, CVA.
	GR No. 184850 2010-10-20	E.Y. INDUSTRIAL SALES v. SHEN DAR ELECTRICITY VELASCO JR., J.
The above rule reflects the oft-repeated legal principle that quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are not bound by technical rules of procedure. Such principle, however, is tempered by fundamental evidentiary rules, including due process. Thus, we ruled in Aya-ay, Sr. v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp.:[28]
	GR No. 187032 2010-10-18	EDGARDO M. PANGANIBAN v. TARA TRADING SHIPMANAGEMENT INC. MENDOZA, J.
It need not be overemphasized that in the absence of substantial evidence, working conditions cannot be accepted to have caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease, in this case, brief psychotic disorder. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by law is real and not merely apparent.[24]