This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2012-07-11 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Burden of proof is the duty of any party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law,[19] which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases.[20] The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment.[21] Particularly, in insurance cases, once an insured makes out a prima facie case in its favor, the burden of evidence shifts to the insurer to controvert the insured's prima facie case.[22] In the present case, UMC established a prima facie case against CBIC. CBIC does not dispute that UMC's stocks in trade were insured against fire under the Insurance Policy and that the warehouse, where UMC's stocks in trade were stored, was gutted by fire on 3 July 1996, within the duration of the fire insurance. However, since CBIC alleged an excepted risk, then the burden of evidence shifted to CBIC to prove such exception. | |||||
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2011-04-12 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| On this point, the Court disagrees with plaintiff that reliance on said laws would suffice to prove that defendants Cojuangco, et al.'s acquisition of SMC shares of stock was illegal as public funds were used. For one, plaintiff's reliance thereon has always had reference only to the CIIF block of shares, and the Court has already settled the same by going over the laws and quoting related findings in the Partial Summary judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 0033-A. For another, the allegations of plaintiff pertaining to the Cojuangco block representing twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding capital stock of SMC stress defendant Cojuangco's acquisition by virtue of his positions as Chief Executive Officer of UCPB, a member-director of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) Governing Board, and a director of the CIIF Oil Mills. Thus, reference to the said laws would not settle whether there was abuse on the part of defendants Cojuangco, et al. of their positions to acquire the SMC shares. [98] | |||||
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2009-01-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It bears stressing that petitioner has the burden of proving her cause of action in the instant case and she may not rely on the weakness of the defense of respondent spouses Ramos. Burden of proof is the duty of any party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases. Preponderance of evidence[37] is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[38] Therefore, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment. For the plaintiff, the burden of proof never parts.[39] For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if established, will be a good defense i.e., an avoidance of the claim.[40] | |||||
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2008-07-21 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[18] Thus, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment. For the plaintiff, the burden to prove its positive assertions never parts. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if established, will be a good defense - i.e. an "avoidance" of the claim.[19] | |||||
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2008-02-12 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Furthermore, as already stated, limitations of liability on the part of the insurer or health care provider must be construed in such a way as to preclude it from evading its obligations. Accordingly, they should be scrutinized by the courts with "extreme jealousy"[23] and "care" and with a "jaundiced eye."[24] Since petitioner had the burden of proving exception to liability, it should have made its own assessment of whether respondent Neomi had a pre-existing condition when it failed to obtain the attending physician's report. It could not just passively wait for Dr. Saniel's report to bail it out. The mere reliance on a disputable presumption does not meet the strict standard required under our jurisprudence. | |||||
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2007-11-22 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Contrary to petitioners' claim, Fireman Sitchon is competent to identify and testify on Exh. "P-2" and Exh. "P-3" because, although he did not sign said documents, he personally prepared the same.[29] What Fireman Sitchon did not prepare were the documents which his investigation witnesses presented.[30] However, Fireman Sitchon emphasized that he interviewed said investigation witnesses namely, Ronald Estanislao, the security guard on duty at the time of fire; and Dr. Zenaida Arcilla, manager of CAPP, before he prepared Exh. "P-2" and Exh. "P-3."[31] Hence, while Fireman Sitchon may have had no personal knowledge of the fire incident, Exh. "P-2" and Exh. "P-3," which he prepared based on the statements of his investigation witnesses, especially that of Ronald Estanislao whose official duty it was to report on the incident, are exceptions to the hearsay rule because these are entries in official records.[32] Consequently, his testimony on said documents are competent evidence of the contents thereof. [33] | |||||