This case has been cited 10 times or more.
2013-12-11 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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To counter the clear and categorical declarations of AAA that accused-appellant raped her, accused-appellant proffered the defense of denial and alibi, totally denying that he was at their house in XXX when the rape happened. We had consistently held that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.[17] This, accused-appellant failed to do. Although defense witness Guinonoy testified that he was with accused-appellant in Chapeh on March 10, 2001, he also acknowledged that the travel time of one to two hours from Chapeh to XXX does not pose an insurmountable barrier for accused-appellant to actually take the trip from Chapeh to XXX and back after committing the crime. Clearly, it was not physically impossible for accused-appellant to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. | |||||
2011-04-06 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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Accused-appellant is essentially challenging AAA's credibility and the weight attributed by the RTC to the prosecution's evidence. However, these are factual matters on which the findings of the trial court, as a general rule, bind the appellate courts. In People v. Malejana,[22] citing People v. Flores,[23] we provided the following explication that: When the credibility of the witnesses is at issue, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court, the latter being in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial unless certain facts of substance and value had been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the results of the case. The underlying reason for this principle has been explained as follows: | |||||
2009-04-07 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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As to the first issue, findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts.[24] When the credibility of the witnesses is at issue, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court, the latter being in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial unless certain facts of substance and value had been overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated which, if considered, might affect the results of the case.[25] | |||||
2008-10-17 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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Accused-appellant's alternative claim of passion or obfuscation likewise deserves no credit. To be entitled to this mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act that produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.[14] There was no evidence of unlawful aggression or any act on the part of the victim that could have caused accused-appellant to act with passion or obfuscation. He failed to present any witness or proof that would support his claim. Thus, the trial and appellate courts were correct in overruling the claim for said mitigating circumstance. | |||||
2008-08-06 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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x x x x In open court, AAA had subjected herself to the glare of public prosecution for rape, positively identified appellant as her rapist and candidly revealed the ugly details of the deplorable violation of her person. Notably, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence to her testimony and they both regarded her as a credible witness. Absent any showing that the lower courts had overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered might affect the result of the case, we find no basis to doubt or dispute, much less overturn, the findings of credibility by both courts. As we have held in People v. Malejana,[19] | |||||
2008-06-18 |
TINGA, J, |
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The defense of alibi must fall in light of AAA's positive identification of appellant. For alibi to prosper, it does not suffice to prove that the accused was at another place when the crime was committed, but it must also be shown that there was physical impossibility for him to have been at the scene of the crime.[33] It was not physically impossible for appellant to go to Noveleta and perpetrate the crime then proceed to Kawit where he was apprehended for it is only a short distance away as shown by the records. | |||||
2008-03-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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Also affirmed is the ruling of the RTC and the Court of Appeals imposing upon the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the imposition of reclusion perpetua is proper pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.[38] | |||||
2007-11-28 |
TINGA, J, |
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The positive identification of appellant must necessarily prevail over his alibi.[54] It was not physically impossible for appellant to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The distance of his house, where he supposedly was, from the locus criminis is only 120-150 meters, more or less.[55] | |||||
2007-07-24 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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We disagree. Petitioner's conviction was based on the positive and direct testimony of the prosecution eyewitness, Villanueva. Absent any evidence of improper motive on her part to testify as principal witness, her testimony deserves full credit.[22] | |||||
2006-07-11 |
CARPIO, J. |
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In his testimony, Manaban admitted shooting Bautista because Bautista turned around and was allegedly about to draw his gun to shoot Manaban. The act of Bautista in turning around is not unlawful and sufficient cause for Manaban to lose his reason and shoot Bautista. That Manaban interpreted such act of Bautista as preparatory to drawing his gun to shoot Manaban does not make Bautista's act unlawful. The threat was only in the mind of Manaban and is mere speculation which is not sufficient to produce obfuscation which is mitigating.[41] Besides, the threat or danger was not grave or serious considering that Manaban had the advantage over Bautista because Manaban was already pointing his firearm at Bautista when the latter turned his back. The defense failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the cause that allegedly produced obfuscation. |