This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2011-08-31 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Pertinently, this Court's ruling in Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals[21] is instructive: With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the appellate docket fees was belatedly made four (4) months after the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear to us that the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal except to order its dismissal, as it rightfully did. Thus, the September 1, 1998 decision of the RTC has passed to the realm of finality and became executory by operation of law. (Underscoring ours.) | |||||
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2011-06-29 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege.[24] The party who seeks to exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost.[25] While the Court, in certain cases, applies the policy of liberal construction, it may be invoked only in situations where there is some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but not where its application subverts the essence of the proceeding or results in the utter disregard of the Rules of Court.[26] | |||||
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2009-03-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Thus, we have no recourse but to affirm the Order of the Court of Appeals dismissing Erlinda's appeal. Pursuant to Section 1(c),[15] Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or that of the appellee, may dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant failed to pay the docket and other lawful fees.[16] Pertinently, this Court's ruling in Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals[17] is instructive:With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the appellate [court] docket fees was belatedly made four (4) months after the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear to us that the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal except to order its dismissal, as it rightfully did. Thus, the September 1, 1998 decision of the RTC has passed to the realm of finality and became executory by operation of law.[18] (Stress supplied.) Finally, we hold that the RTC erred in giving due course to the notice of appeal, supposedly in the interest of substantial justice. The bare invocation of the phrase, "the interest of substantial justice," is not a magic spell that will automatically allow the Court to suspend procedural rules, despite the jurisdictional bar. The rules may be relaxed only in exceptionally meritorious cases.[19] In this case, the messenger's alleged inadvertence to secure a postal money order for the appellate court docket fees[20] is not a meritorious reason to justify an exception in our jurisprudence.[21] | |||||