This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2011-04-04 |
BRION, J. |
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| The jurisdiction of courts and quasi-judicial bodies is determined by the Constitution and the law.[44] It cannot be fixed by the will of the parties to a dispute;[45] the parties can neither expand nor diminish a tribunal's jurisdiction by stipulation or agreement. The text of Section 4 of E.O. 1008 is broad enough to cover any dispute arising from, or connected with construction contracts, whether these involve mere contractual money claims or execution of the works.[46] Considering the intent behind the law and the broad language adopted, LICOMCEN erred in insisting on its restrictive interpretation of GC-61. The CIAC's jurisdiction cannot be limited by the parties' stipulation that only disputes in connection with or arising out of the physical construction activities (execution of the works) are arbitrable before it. | |||||
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2009-06-16 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Sections 10[15] and 11,[16] Article X of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to this Court's ruling in Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal,[17] the RTC held that the modification or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities can be done only through a law enacted by Congress which shall be subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Hence, the RTC opined that it is without jurisdiction to fix the territorial boundaries of the parties. Pateros filed a Motion for Reconsideration[18] which was, however, denied by the RTC in its Order[19] dated August 30, 1996. Aggrieved, Pateros appealed to the CA.[20] | |||||