This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2014-11-10 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| TCT No. M-00861 was derived from a mother title, TCT No. 23377,[37] which was the subject of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Guido, et al.[38] The case stemmed from a complaint, filed by the Republic of the Philippines, for declaration of nullity of Decree No. 6145, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377, and all titles derived from the decree.[39] The Republic also prayed that the land covered by the decree be declared in its name, except those parcels of land validly acquired by third persons. According to the Republic, Decree No. 6145 was spurious and false and, in turn, the reconstituted TCT No. 23377, as well as the derivative titles, was invalid.[40] Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 were genuine and authentic.[41] | |||||
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2014-11-10 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated November 10, 2011 and resolution dated February 23, 2012 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is, however, REMANDED to the trial court for presentation of evidence to determine whether the 9,751-square-meter parcel of land located in Barrio Macamot, Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, technically described as Cadastral Lot No. 11566, Psu-04-006561, is included in TCT No. 23377, and to proceed accordingly with this court's ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Guido, et al.[84] | |||||
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2014-04-23 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| As to the appropriateness of the petition, the CA rejected petitioner's supposition that the issue to be resolved is only a pure question of law, that is, the determination or interpretation of what an "appropriate proceeding" is as referred to in the dispositive portion of Republic v. Court of Appeals[11] (Guido). It held that since the petition raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the land registration court, the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules properly applies. Anent the timeliness of the petition, the CA overlooked the procedural lapse of filing the petition beyond the 60-day reglementary period in the interest of substantial justice given the compelling merit of the petition. | |||||
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2013-09-30 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| This Court has already ruled in the abovementioned Guido case[11] that while TCT No. 23377 and its derivative titles, which include TCT No. M-2102, serve as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the persons whose names appear therein, this Court took judicial notice of the fact that certain portions of the land covered by TCT No. 23377 either "were in possession of occupants who successfully obtained certificates of titles over the area occupied by them" or were occupied by persons "who had not obtained certificates of titles over the area possessed by them but the lengths of their possession were long enough to amount to ownership, had the land been in fact unregistered." This Court then proceeded to rule that while prescription is unavailing against the owners of the land covered by TCT No. 23377, on the ground that they are holders of a valid certificate of title, the equitable presumption of laches may be applied against them for failure to assert their ownership for such an unreasonable length of time. This pro hac vice ruling of the Court was further based on the established fact that the abovementioned owners, by agreement with the Office of the Solicitor General, have actually waived their rights over the property subject of the said case in favor of "those who possessed and actually occupied specific portions and obtained [T]orrens [C]ertificates of [T]itles, and those who possessed certain specific portions for such length of time as to amount to full ownership."[12] This Court, thus, held that it is imperative for those possessors, whose alleged bona fide occupancy of specific portions of TCT No. 23377 is not evidenced by Torrens Titles, to prove their claims in an appropriate proceeding. Among these occupants was, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Antonia Victorino who, as found by the RTC in its assailed decision has duly proven that, together with her predecessor-in-interest, she has been in public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession against the whole world and in the concept of an owner of the subject lot for a period of more than thirty (30) years.[13] | |||||
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2009-07-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[16] we explained that: In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Stated differently, the general rule in civil cases is that a party having the burden of proof of an essential fact must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon (I Moore on Facts, 4, cited in Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. VII, Part II, p. 542, 1973 Edition). By preponderance of evidence is meant simply evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it (32 C.J.S., 1051), The term 'preponderance of evidence' means the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the terms `greater weight of evidence' or 'greater weight, of the credible evidence.' Preponderance of the evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. Preponderance of the evidence means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. x x x." (20 Am. Jur., 1100-1101) | |||||
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2006-11-24 |
CORONA, J. |
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| In 1979, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Decree No. 6145, the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 23377 in the names of Francisco and Hermogenes Guido[5] and all titles derived from the decree.[6] This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 34242 of the former Court of First Instance[7] of Rizal.[8] These documents covered a vast area of land called "Hacienda Angono" located in Binangonan, Rizal.[9] The Republic alleged that said documents were false, spurious, fabricated and never issued by virtue of judicial proceedings for the registration of land.[10] The trial court dismissed the complaint and declared Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 genuine and authentic.[11] This was affirmed by the CA.[12] | |||||
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2006-11-24 |
CORONA, J. |
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| In our decision in Republic v. CA,[17] we upheld the findings of the courts below that Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 were authentic.[18] However, we also took into consideration the fact that the private respondents therein unanimously accepted the alternative prayer of the Solicitor General:Moreover, conscious of the resulting "[large-scale] dispossession and social displacement of several hundreds of bona fide occupants and their families" which the Solicitor General pointed out, the private respondent[s] agreed unanimously to accept the alternative prayer of the petitioner in their joint memorandum. This agreement by private respondents takes the form of a waiver. Though a valid and clear right over the property exists in their [favor], they seemingly have voluntarily abandoned the same in favor of: 1) those who possessed and actually occupied specific portions and obtained torrens certificates of titles, and 2) those who possessed certain specific portions for such lengths of time as to amount to full ownership. The waiver, not being contrary to law, morals, good customs and good policy, is valid and binding on the private respondents. | |||||
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2006-11-24 |
CORONA, J. |
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| To resolve this issue, there is a need to revisit our ruling in Republic v. CA. As already stated, we ruled there that, as Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 were authentic documents, Guido et al. had incontrovertible title to the land. Nevertheless, Guido et al., through their waiver, were also considered to have abandoned their right in favor of two sets of occupants: (1) those who possessed and actually occupied specific portions and obtained Torrens Certificates of Titles and (2) those who possessed certain specific portions for such a length of time as to amount to full ownership, to be determined in an appropriate proceeding.[34] | |||||