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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GREGORIO G. PINEDA

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 154623 2009-03-13	JIMMY T. GO v. CLERK OF COURT LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
We have time and again reiterated the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by injunction.[16] This doctrine of non-interference is premised on the principle that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.[17] As correctly ratiocinated by the CA, cases wherein an execution order has been issued, are still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.[18] Since the Bacolod RTC had already acquired jurisdiction over the collection suit (Civil Case No. 98-10404) and rendered judgment in relation thereto, it retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts over its judgment, including all incidents relative to the control and conduct of its ministerial officers, namely public respondent sheriffs. Thus, the issuance by the Pasig RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 68125 was a clear act of interference with the judgment of Bacolod RTC in Civil Case No. 98-10404.
	GR Nos. 152505-06 2007-09-13	PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE v. EQUINOX LAND CORPORATION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Moreover, in its Reply to Equinox's Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss before the RTC, Prudential, citing Philippine National Bank v. Pineda[6] and Finman General Assurance Corporation v. Salik,[7] argued that as a surety, it is considered under the law to be the same party as the obligor in relation to whatever is adjudged regarding the latter's obligation. Therefore, it is the CIAC which has jurisdiction over the case involving a construction contract between Equinox and J'Marc. Such an admission by Prudential binds it and it cannot now claim otherwise.
	GR NO. 144740 2005-08-31	SECURITY PACIFIC ASSURANCE CORPORATION v. AMELIA TRIA-INFANTE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Petitioner does not deny that the contract between it and Villaluz is one of surety. However, it points out that the kind of surety agreement between them is one that merely waives its right of excussion. This cannot be so. The counter-bond itself states that the parties jointly and severally bind themselves to secure the payment of any judgment that the plaintiff may recover against the defendant in the action. A surety is considered in law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable.[40]
	GR NO. 137232 2005-06-29	ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS CORPORATION v. HOME BANKERS SAVINGS SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Petitioners' insistence that the ownership of the raw materials remained with the bank is untenable. In Sia vs. People,[9] Abad vs. Court of Appeals,[10] and PNB vs. Pineda,[11] we held that:"If under the trust receipt, the bank is made to appear as the owner, it was but an artificial expedient, more of legal fiction than fact, for if it were really so, it could dispose of the goods in any manner it wants, which it cannot do, just to give consistency with purpose of the trust receipt of giving a stronger security for the loan obtained by the importer. To consider the bank as the true owner from the inception of the transaction would be to disregard the loan feature thereof..."[12]
	GR No. 159622 2004-07-30	LANDL v. METROPOLITAN BANK YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The initial repossession by the bank of the goods subject of the trust receipt did not result in the full satisfaction of the petitioners' loan obligation. Petitioners are apparently laboring under the mistaken impression that the full turn-over of the goods suffices to divest them of their obligation to repay the principal amount of their loan obligation. This is definitely not the case. In Philippine National Bank v. Hon. Gregorio G. Pineda and Tayabas Cement Company, Inc.,[9] we had occasion to rule: PNB's possession of the subject machinery and equipment being precisely as a form of security for the advances given to TCC under the Letter of Credit, said possession by itself cannot be considered payment of the loan secured thereby. Payment would legally result only after PNB had foreclosed on said securities, sold the same and applied the proceeds thereof to TCC's loan obligation. Mere possession does not amount to foreclosure for foreclosure denotes the procedure adopted by the mortgagee to terminate the rights of the mortgagor on the property and includes the sale itself.