This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2012-01-30 |
REYES, J. |
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| All told, petitioner's appointment as well as its consequent termination falls within the ambit of the discretion bestowed on the appointing authority, the President. Simply put, his appointment can be terminated at any time for any cause and without the need of prior notice or hearing since he can be removed from his office anytime. His termination cannot be said to be violative of Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. When a temporary appointee is required to relinquish his office, he is being separated from office because his term has expired.[15] Starkly put, upon the appointment of respondent Bessat as his replacement, his term of office had already expired. | |||||
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2011-03-29 |
BRION, J. |
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| The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. An acting appointee accepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is called to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore, his term of office is not fixed but endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority. His separation from the service does not import removal but merely the expiration of his term -- a mode of termination of official relations that falls outside the coverage of the constitutional provision on security of tenure[38] since no removal from office is involved. | |||||
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2011-03-29 |
BRION, J. |
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| Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition.[69] The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority.[70] The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right[71] to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail. | |||||
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2010-02-11 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Petitioner further contends that even if Bautista's appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA was intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition, citing the rationale in Achacoso v. Macaraig.[10] Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not enumerate temporariness as one (1) of the exceptions thereto. And since a temporary designation does not have a maximum duration, it can go on for months or years. In effect, the temporary appointment/designation can effectively circumvent the prohibition. Allowing undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to occupy other government posts would open a Pandora's Box as to let them feast on choice government positions. Thus, in case of vacancy where no permanent appointment could as yet be made, the remedy would be to designate one (1) of the two (2) Deputy Administrators as the Acting Administrator. Such would be the logical course, the said officers being in a better position in terms of knowledge and experience to run the agency in a temporary capacity. Should none of them merit the President's confidence, then the practical remedy would be for Undersecretary Bautista to first resign as Undersecretary in order to qualify her as Administrator of MARINA. As to whether she in fact does not receive or has waived any remuneration, the same does not matter because remuneration is not an element in determining whether there has been a violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.[11] | |||||
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2007-08-14 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Insofar as the principles governing permanent and temporary appointments are concerned, this Court finds the ruling in the more recent case of Achacoso v. Macaraig[14] relevant and instructive. While Achacoso served as the jurisprudential basis in cases involving the issue of security of tenure in career executive service positions in the government, this Court finds the rules on permanent and temporary appointments enunciated therein applicable to the present case. | |||||