This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2015-11-25 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| The Court has used these guidelines not only for the crime of illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm itself but also in the appreciation of the special aggravating circumstance of using an unlicensed firearm[30] in the commission of a crime.[31] | |||||
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2015-06-17 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| On the other hand, the Court does not find credence in Palanas's defense of alibi. It is axiomatic that alibi is an inherently weak defense,[34] and may only be considered if the following circumstances are shown: (a) he was somewhere else when the crime occurred; and (b) it would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.[35] In this case, the RTC correctly observed that aside from the admission that travel from Paranaque City to Pasig City only takes about one (1) hour, the incident occurred on a Sunday when traffic is not usually heavy. Moreover, Palanas had access to a motorcycle that allowed him to travel faster on the date and time of the incident.[36] Under the circumstances, there is the possibility that Palanas could have been present at the locus criminis at the time of the shooting. Accordingly, his defense of alibi must fall. | |||||
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2014-04-21 |
REYES, J. |
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| For the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[9] Since Dulay was not able to prove that he was in Dibul when the crime was committed, both the CA and the RTC were correct in disregarding his alibi. Junior and Melanie, Junior's elder sister, on the other hand, have both positively identified Dulay as the assailant. On this score, this Court has held in a number of cases that denial and alibi are weak defenses, which cannot prevail against positive identification.[10] | |||||
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2014-01-15 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| In addition, the witnesses incriminating Ricardo were not only credible but were not shown to have harbored any ill-motive towards him. They were surely entitled to full faith and credit for those reasons, and both the RTC and the CA did well in according such credence to them. Their positive identification of him as the assailant prevailed over his mere denial, because such denial, being negative and self-serving evidence, was undeserving of weight by virtue of its lack of substantiation by clear and convincing proof.[17] Hence, his denial had no greater evidentiary value than the affirmative testimonies of the credible witnesses presented against him.[18] | |||||
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2012-11-14 |
REYES, J. |
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| The denial of Lansangan cannot exculpate him from the criminal charge. It is well-settled that denial, just like alibi, cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the complainant.[16] Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crime attributed to him.[17] Apparently, in the instant case, Lansangan failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, particularly XXX, that would have impelled her to testify falsely against him. Thus, it was held in People v. Agcanas:[18] | |||||
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2012-10-24 |
REYES, J. |
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| At any rate, settled is the rule that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the complainant.[13] We thus ruled in People v. Agcanas:[14] | |||||