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ANTONIO Y. CO v. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 210164 2015-08-18	ROMMEL C. ARNADO v. COMELEC DEL CASTILLO, J.
SO ORDERED.[11]
	GR No. 191810 2015-06-22	JIMMY T. GO v. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION PERALTA, J.
Go, Sr. is, thus, considered a citizen by election under the Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625. After such election, he is, for all intents and purposes, considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. For the respondents to collaterally attack Go, Sr.'s citizenship would do grave injustice against him since he was not afforded the opportunity to defend his right to be called a Filipino citizen. Even naturalized Filipino citizens are protected against such challenges, what more a person considered as natural-born citizen? In Antonio Y, Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[43] We said that:The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This cannot be done. In our jurisprudence, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity (See Queto vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970]).
	GR No. 191970 2012-04-24	ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS v. COMELEC ABAD, J.
Two. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother's house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative.[15] To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
	GR No. 183133 2010-07-26	BALGAMELO CABILING MA v. COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ PEREZ, J.
Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, is in line with our decisions in In Re:Florencio Mallare,[47] Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[48] and Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching.[49]
	GR No. 187478 2009-12-21	REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
We do not agree. The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals,[33] which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives. [34]
	GR No. 185401 2009-07-21	HENRY 'JUN' DUEÑAS v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL CORONA, J.
In Co v. HRET,[40] we held that: The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.[41] (emphasis supplied)
	GR No. 180088 2009-01-19	MANUEL B. JAPZON v. COMELEC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
	GR Nos. 163619-20 2005-11-17	IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA v. CARLOS BOADO CARPIO, J.
The concept of residence in determining a candidate's qualification is already a settled matter. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile.[15] In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[16] this Court declared:x x x The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
	GR No. 161434 2004-03-03	MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON v. COMELEC VITUG, J.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat.[47] I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.