This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2009-06-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We are without jurisdiction to modify, much less reverse, a final and executory judgment. In Paramount Vinyl Products Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[29] we recognized the well-settled rule that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional. The failure to interpose a timely appeal (or a motion for reconsideration) renders the assailed decision, order or award final and executory that deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the final judgment. The rule is applicable indiscriminately to one and all since the rule is grounded on fundamental consideration of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law. | |||||
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2008-10-29 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The Court is without jurisdiction to modify, much less, reverse, a final and executory judgment. It has been pronounced by the Court in Paramount Vinyl Products Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission[50] that:Well-settled is the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to interpose a timely appeal (or a motion for reconsideration) renders the assailed decision, order or award final and executory that deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the final judgment [Cruz v. WCC, G.R. No. L-42739, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 445; Volkshel Labor Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-39686, June 28, 1980, 98 SCRA 314; Acda v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 51607, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 306; Rizal Empire Insurance Group v. NLRC, G.R. No. 73140, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 565; MAI Philippines Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 73662, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 196; Narag v. NLRC, G.R. No. 69628, October 28, 1987, 155 SCRA 199; John Clement Consultants, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 72096, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 635; Bongay v. Martinez, G.R. No. 77188, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 552; Manuel L. Quezon University v. Manuel L. Quezon Educational Institution, G.R. No. 82312, April 19, 1989, 172 SCRA 597]. This rule "is applicable indiscriminately to one and all since the rule is grounded on fundamental consideration of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law" [Volkschel Labor Union v. NLRC, supra, at p. 322]. Although, in a few instances, the Court has disregarded procedural lapses so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period (See Flexo Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 55971, February 28, 1985,135 SCRA 145; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lariosa, G.R. No. 70479, February 27, 1989, 148 SCRA 187; Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81471, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 831], the Court did so on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. (Emphasis ours.) | |||||
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2006-06-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The hornbook principle is stated in Paramount Vinyl Products Corp. v. NLRC,[8] thus: x x x Failure to interpose a timely appeal (or motion for reconsideration) renders the assailed decision, order or award final and executory that deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the final judgment. x x x This rule "is applicable indiscriminately to one and all since the rule is grounded on fundamental consideration of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law." x x x Although, in a few instances, the Court has disregarded procedural lapses so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period, x x x the Court did so on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. In the present petition, no convincing argument was presented to show that the trial court erred in finding that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest had validly disposed of their shares in the estate of Felix Gesmundo, Sr. by executing a Deed of Sale dated August 11, 1947 and two deeds of partition dated February 1, 1952 and January 9, 1957, respectively, hence, petitioners only have inheritance rights over the conjugal share of the deceased first wife of Felix Gesmundo, Sr.. Verily, the instant case is not meritorious enough to deserve relaxation of the rules regarding timeliness of the filing of a motion for reconsideration. | |||||