Lawyerly

GR Nos. 169823-24

2013-09-11

BERSAMIN, J.

Ostensibly, the PCGG's letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),[17] viz:x x x [T]he PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.

GR No. 139930

2012-06-26

REPUBLIC v. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO

ABAD, J.

About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019[6] against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of directors, before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged that UCPB's investment in UNICOM was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since UNICOM had a capitalization of only P5 million and it had no track record of operation. In the process of conversion to voting common shares, the government's P495 million investment was reduced by P95 million which was credited to UNICOM's incorporators. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2810 in line with the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[7] which disqualified the PCGG from conducting the preliminary investigation in the case.

GR No. 139930

2012-06-26

REPUBLIC v. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO

ABAD, J.

Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years.[16] Since the acts complained of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.[17]

GR No. 192935

2010-12-07

LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

MENDOZA, J.

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President's power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency - is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]

GR No. 148269

2010-11-22

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS THRU PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. ANIANO DESIERTO

BRION, J.

The PCGG's power to issue a subpoena under EO No. 1 is pursuant to its power to investigate cases of graft and corruption. In this case the complaint was referred to the Ombudsman, not the PCGG, for preliminary investigation. Under Section 15(1) of RA 6770, the Ombudsman is empowered to investigate and prosecute offenses involving public officers and employees. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[48] we emphasized that the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction over cases involving public officers and employees, even as we recognized the PCGG's concurrent jurisdiction. Nothing in EO No. 1 would have prevented the Ombudsman from exercising his powers under Section 15(8) of RA 6770 to "[ajdminister oaths, issue subpoena x x x including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records," especially since the complaint was filed before him.

GR No. 174350

2008-08-13

SPS. BERNYL BALANGAUAN KATHERENE BALANGAUAN v. CA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. Though some cases[35] describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.[36] A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.[37] A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an Information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former's order or resolutions. In this case, since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution finds no application. Be that as it may, the DOJ rectified the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved respondent HSBC's motion for reconsideration.

GR No. 166510

2008-07-23

PEOPLE v. BENJAMIN 'KOKOY' T. ROMUALDEZ

BRION, J.

To support his prescription argument, Romualdez posited that the 15-year prescription under Section 11 of RA 3019 had lapsed since the preliminary investigation of the case for an offense committed on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986 commenced only in May 2001 after a Division of the Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman. He argued that there was no interruption of the prescriptive period for the offense because the proceedings undertaken under the 1987 complaint filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) were null and void pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Cojuangco Jr. v. PCGG[5] and Cruz Jr [sic].[6] He likewise argued that the Revised Penal Code provision[7] that prescription does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines should not apply to his case, as he was charged with an offense not covered by the Revised Penal Code; the law on the prescription of offenses punished under special laws (Republic Act No. 3326) does not contain any rule similar to that found in the Revised Penal Code.

GR No. 175057

2008-01-29

MA. ROSARIO SANTOS-CONCIO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Petitioners concede that the DOJ has the power to conduct both criminal investigation and preliminary investigation but not in their case,[24] they invoking Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG.[25] They posit that in Cojuangco, the reshuffling of personnel was not considered by this Court which ruled that the entity which conducted the criminal investigation is disqualified from conducting a preliminary investigation in the same case. They add that the DOJ cannot circumvent the prohibition by simply creating a panel to conduct the first, and another to conduct the second.

GR NO. 135123

2007-01-22

REPUBLIC v. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO

AZCUNA, J.

The reason for its creation "and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers."[8] Consequently, the Ombudsman "investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining"[9] whether the information may be prepared. If the Ombudsman finds a prima facie case against the person, "the corresponding information or informations can be filed with the Sandiganbayan."[10]

GR NO. 159190

2006-05-30

CAYETANO A. TEJANO v. OMBUDSMAN

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government[23] concedes the applicability of the prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier decided, thus:Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from handling the case. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. His actuation must inspire that belief. This is an instance when appearance is as important as reality.

GR NO. 156081

2005-10-19

FERDINAND T. SANTOS v. WILSON GO

QUISUMBING, J.

Though some cases[19] describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.[20] A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.[21] A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former's order or resolutions.

GR No. 159190

2005-06-30

CAYETANO A. TEJANO v. OMBUDSMAN

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government[23] concedes the applicability of the prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier decided, thus: Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from handling the case. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an

GR No. 159747

2004-04-13

SAN II v. PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF DOJ

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of Justice in connection with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill gotten wealth cases, may conduct the investigation.[9] (Emphasis supplied)

GR No. 143375

2001-07-06

RUTH D. BAUTISTA v. CA

BELLOSILLO, J.

Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG,[4] Koh v. Court of Appeals,[5] Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte[6] and Crespo v. Mogul.[7] In these cases this Court held that the power to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds true only in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the similarity ends.

	GR Nos. 169823-24 2013-09-11	HERMINIO T. DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN BERSAMIN, J.
Ostensibly, the PCGG's letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),[17] viz:x x x [T]he PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.
	GR No. 139930 2012-06-26	REPUBLIC v. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO ABAD, J.
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019[6] against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of directors, before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged that UCPB's investment in UNICOM was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since UNICOM had a capitalization of only P5 million and it had no track record of operation. In the process of conversion to voting common shares, the government's P495 million investment was reduced by P95 million which was credited to UNICOM's incorporators. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2810 in line with the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[7] which disqualified the PCGG from conducting the preliminary investigation in the case.
	GR No. 139930 2012-06-26	REPUBLIC v. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO ABAD, J.
Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years.[16] Since the acts complained of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.[17]
	GR No. 192935 2010-12-07	LOUIS 'BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 MENDOZA, J.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President's power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency - is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]
	GR No. 148269 2010-11-22	PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS THRU PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. ANIANO DESIERTO BRION, J.
The PCGG's power to issue a subpoena under EO No. 1 is pursuant to its power to investigate cases of graft and corruption. In this case the complaint was referred to the Ombudsman, not the PCGG, for preliminary investigation. Under Section 15(1) of RA 6770, the Ombudsman is empowered to investigate and prosecute offenses involving public officers and employees. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[48] we emphasized that the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction over cases involving public officers and employees, even as we recognized the PCGG's concurrent jurisdiction. Nothing in EO No. 1 would have prevented the Ombudsman from exercising his powers under Section 15(8) of RA 6770 to "[ajdminister oaths, issue subpoena x x x including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records," especially since the complaint was filed before him.
	GR No. 174350 2008-08-13	SPS. BERNYL BALANGAUAN KATHERENE BALANGAUAN v. CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. Though some cases[35] describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.[36] A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.[37] A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an Information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former's order or resolutions. In this case, since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution finds no application. Be that as it may, the DOJ rectified the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved respondent HSBC's motion for reconsideration.
	GR No. 166510 2008-07-23	PEOPLE v. BENJAMIN 'KOKOY' T. ROMUALDEZ BRION, J.
To support his prescription argument, Romualdez posited that the 15-year prescription under Section 11 of RA 3019 had lapsed since the preliminary investigation of the case for an offense committed on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986 commenced only in May 2001 after a Division of the Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman. He argued that there was no interruption of the prescriptive period for the offense because the proceedings undertaken under the 1987 complaint filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) were null and void pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Cojuangco Jr. v. PCGG[5] and Cruz Jr [sic].[6] He likewise argued that the Revised Penal Code provision[7] that prescription does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines should not apply to his case, as he was charged with an offense not covered by the Revised Penal Code; the law on the prescription of offenses punished under special laws (Republic Act No. 3326) does not contain any rule similar to that found in the Revised Penal Code.
	GR No. 175057 2008-01-29	MA. ROSARIO SANTOS-CONCIO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CARPIO MORALES, J.
Petitioners concede that the DOJ has the power to conduct both criminal investigation and preliminary investigation but not in their case,[24] they invoking Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG.[25] They posit that in Cojuangco, the reshuffling of personnel was not considered by this Court which ruled that the entity which conducted the criminal investigation is disqualified from conducting a preliminary investigation in the same case. They add that the DOJ cannot circumvent the prohibition by simply creating a panel to conduct the first, and another to conduct the second.
	GR NO. 135123 2007-01-22	REPUBLIC v. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO AZCUNA, J.
The reason for its creation "and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers."[8] Consequently, the Ombudsman "investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining"[9] whether the information may be prepared. If the Ombudsman finds a prima facie case against the person, "the corresponding information or informations can be filed with the Sandiganbayan."[10]
	GR NO. 159190 2006-05-30	CAYETANO A. TEJANO v. OMBUDSMAN CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government[23] concedes the applicability of the prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier decided, thus:Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from handling the case. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. His actuation must inspire that belief. This is an instance when appearance is as important as reality.
	GR NO. 156081 2005-10-19	FERDINAND T. SANTOS v. WILSON GO QUISUMBING, J.
Though some cases[19] describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.[20] A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.[21] A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former's order or resolutions.
	GR No. 159190 2005-06-30	CAYETANO A. TEJANO v. OMBUDSMAN CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government[23] concedes the applicability of the prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier decided, thus: Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from handling the case. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an
	GR No. 159747 2004-04-13	SAN II v. PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF DOJ AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of Justice in connection with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill gotten wealth cases, may conduct the investigation.[9] (Emphasis supplied)
	GR No. 143375 2001-07-06	RUTH D. BAUTISTA v. CA BELLOSILLO, J.
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG,[4] Koh v. Court of Appeals,[5] Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Norte[6] and Crespo v. Mogul.[7] In these cases this Court held that the power to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds true only in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the similarity ends.

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO v. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT