This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2013-11-20 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Such power of the President to segregate lands was provided for in Section 64(e) of the old Revised Administrative Code and C.A. No. 141 or the Public Land Act. Later, the power of the President was restated in Section 14, Chapter 4, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code. When a property is officially declared a military reservation, it becomes inalienable and outside the commerce of man.[66] It may not be the subject of a contract or of a compromise agreement.[67] A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership, until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.[68] In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and De Jesus,[69] it was even stated that | |||||
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2012-06-27 |
BRION, J. |
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| At this point, it becomes unnecessary to decide the legality of Section 7 of DOJ Department Circular No. 70 allowing the outright dismissal of MERALCO's petition for review. It is basic that this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground.[17] | |||||
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2011-01-18 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue; therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to decide on that question. Respondent cites Laurel v. Garcia,[9] wherein the Court said that it "will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground" and goes on to claim that since this Court, in the Decision, disposed of the petition on some other ground, i.e., lack of standing of petitioners, there was no need for it to delve into the validity of R.A. No. 95, and the rest of the judgment should be deemed obiter. | |||||
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2009-04-02 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Thus, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but a government instrumentality which is exempt from any kind of tax from the local governments. Indeed, the exercise of the taxing power of local government units is subject to the limitations enumerated in Section 133 of the Local Government Code.[10] Under Section 133(o)[11] of the Local Government Code, local government units have no power to tax instrumentalities of the national government like the MIAA. Hence, MIAA is not liable to pay real property tax for the NAIA Pasay properties. | |||||
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2007-11-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules.[72] Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.[73] | |||||
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2007-10-02 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Indeed, it is quite true that a property continues to be part of the public domain, and not available for alienation, private appropriation or ownership, until it is withdrawn from being such by the Government through the Executive Department or the Legislative,[10] and that it is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the Government on his own sole will as any such conveyance requires executive and legislative concurrence.[11] | |||||
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2003-11-11 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Cebu City is an end user government agency, just like the Bases Conversion and Development Authority or the Department of Foreign Affairs.[21] Thus, Congress may by law transfer public lands to the City of Cebu to be used for municipal purposes, which may be public or patrimonial. Lands thus acquired by the City of Cebu for a public purpose may not be sold to private parties. However, lands so acquired by the City of Cebu for a patrimonial purpose may be sold to private parties, including private corporations. | |||||
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2003-05-06 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| There are, moreover, special circumstances that disqualify Amari from invoking equity principles. Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this petition, two Senate Committees[14] had already approved on September 16, 1997 Senate Committee Report No. 560. This Report concluded, after a well-publicized investigation into PEA's sale of the Freedom Islands to Amari, that the Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and assuming all the attendant risks, including the annulment of the Amended JVA. | |||||