Lawyerly

GR No. 198096

2015-07-08

CENTENNIAL TRANSMARINE v. PASTOR M. QUIAMBAO

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Moreover, a seaman's entitlement to disability benefits, is governed, not only by medical findings, but by law (the Labor Code) and by contract (the POEA-SEC and the parties' CBA).[42] Here, the POEA-SEC, as provided under Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment, which contains the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing The Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, governs the employment contract between Pastor and petitioners. Section 20(B), paragraph 6 thereof reads:Section 20 (B) - COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

GR No. 198528

2014-10-13

MAGSAYSAY MITSUI OSK MARINE v. JUANITO G. BENGSON

DEL CASTILLO, J.

In many cases decided in the past, this Court has held that cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, and other heart ailments are compensable. Thus, in Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc. v. Balasta,[28] severe 3-vessel coronary artery disease which the seaman contracted while serving as Able Seaman was considered an occupational disease. In Villanueva, Sr. v. Baliwag Navigation, Inc.,[29] it was held that the 2000 POEA-SEC considers heart disease as an occupational disease. In Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Undag,[30] the Court held that hypertensive cardiovascular disease may be a compensable illness, upon proof. In Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. v. Bastol[31] and Heirs of the late Aniban v. National Labor Relations Commission,[32] it was held that myocardial infarction as a disease or cause of death is compensable, such being occupational. Iloreta v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.[33] held that hypertensive cardiovascular disease/coronary artery disease and chronic stable angina are compensable. Micronesia Resources v. Cantomayor[34] stated that a finding of coronary artery disease entitles the claimant a seaman Third Officer to disability compensation. In Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission,[35] the Court held that the claimant a musician on board an ocean-going vessel was entitled to recover for suffering from coronary artery disease. In Sepulveda v. Employees' Compensation Commission,[36] it was declared that the employee's illness, myocardial infarction, was directly brought about by his employment as schoolteacher or was a result of the nature of such employment.

GR No. 181921

2014-09-17

INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES v. VICTOR M. CREER III

DEL CASTILLO, J.

For an illness to be compensable, Section 20(B)(6)[29] of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions), deemed incorporated in the POEA Contract, requires the concurrence of two elements: first, that the illness must be work-related; and second, that the work-related illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.[30]

GR No. 198097

2014-07-30

STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION v. SPS. MARGARITO B. DELALAMON AND PRISCILA A. DELALAMON

REYES, J.

The purpose of the rule is to allow the employer's doctors a reasonable opportunity to assess the seafarer's medical condition in order to determine whether his illness is work-related or not. As explained in Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Undag:[28]

GR No. 198388

2014-07-28

JORAINA DRAGON TALOSIG v. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES

SERENO, C.J.

In other words, the claimant must not merely rely on the disputable presumption, but must be able to present no less than substantial evidence to support her claim. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It must reach the level of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.[19]

GR No. 193047

2014-03-03

FIL-PRIDE SHIPPING COMPANY v. EDGAR A. BALASTA

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Just the same, in several cases, cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, as well as other heart ailments were held to be compensable.[33] Likewise, petitioners failed to refute respondent's allegations in his Position Paper that in the performance of his duties as Able Seaman, he inhaled, was exposed to, and came into direct contact with various injurious and harmful chemicals, dust, fumes/ emissions, and other irritant agents; that he performed strenuous tasks such as lifting, pulling, pushing and/or moving equipment and materials on board the ship; that he was constantly exposed to varying temperatures of extreme hot and cold as the ship crossed ocean boundaries; that he was exposed as well to harsh weather conditions; that in most instances, he was required to perform overtime work; and that the work of an Able Seaman is both physically and mentally stressful. It does not require much imagination to realize or conclude that these tasks could very well cause the illness that respondent, then already 47 years old, suffered from six months into his employment contract with petitioners. The following pronouncement in a recent case very well applies to respondent: x x x His constant exposure to hazards such as chemicals and the varying temperature, like the heat in the kitchen of the vessel and the coldness outside, coupled by stressful tasks in his employment caused, or at least aggravated, his illness. It is already recognized that any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally resulting in wear and tear of the human body.[34]

GR No. 188595

2013-08-28

SEA POWER SHIPPING ENTERPRISES v. NENITA P. SALAZAR

SERENO, C.J.

In fulfilling these requisites, respondent must present no less than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It must reach the level of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.[32]

GR No. 179607

2013-07-24

CIRILA MANOTA v. AVANTGARDE SHIPPING CORPORATION

PERALTA, J.

Petitioners' admission that no symptoms of Enrique's illness had manifested at the time of his arrival in the Philippines revealed that he indeed was not suffering of any ailment then, and was even in good health upon his arrival which even bolstered our earlier findings that he was repatriated due to the completion of his employment contract and not due to any medical reason. Moreover, the post-employment medical examination within 3 days from Enrique's arrival is required in order to ascertain his physical condition, since to ignore the rule would set a precedent with negative repercussions because it would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits.[31] It would certainly be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's illness considering the passage of time.[32] In such a case, the employers would have no protection against unrelated disability claims.[33]

GR No. 195518

2013-03-20

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME SERVICES v. EARLWIN MEINRAD ANTERO F. LAUREL

MENDOZA, J.

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, two elements must concur for an injury or illness of a seafarer to be compensable. First, the injury or illness must be work-related; and second, that the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.[25] Both requisites obtain in this case.

GR No. 175491

2012-12-10

CREW v. JINA T. SORIA

MENDOZA, J.

The rule is that, in labor cases, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. The oft-repeated rule is that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.[26] Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegations cannot stand as it will offend due process.[27]

GR No. 187337

2012-12-05

LOADSTAR INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING v. HEIRS OF LATE ENRIQUE C. CALAWIGAN

PEREZ, J.

Time and again, we have ruled that self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence.[31] Often described as more than a mere scintilla,[32] substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.[33] To our mind, Calawigan's unsubstantiated assertion that he requested for a post-employment medical examination from LISI does not even come close to approximating the foregoing quantum of proof. Given that compliance with said requirement is mandatory and the unexplained omission thereof will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits,[34] the CA clearly erred when it adjudged Calawigan entitled to sickness allowance and permanent disability compensation despite his failure to abide by the procedure outlined under the POEA-SEC. As it would be fairly easy for a physician to determine whether the injury or ailment is work-related within three-days from repatriation, to ignore the requirement would set a precedent with negative repercussions which would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits.[35]

GR No. 175170

2012-09-05

MISAMIS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE v. VIRGILIO M. CAGALAWAN

DEL CASTILLO, J.

When there is doubt between the evidence submitted by the employer and that submitted by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee.[47] This is consistent with the rule that an employer's cause could only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the employee's evidence.[48] Thus, MORESCO II cannot rely on the weakness of Ortiz's certification in order to give more credit to its own evidence. Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are not sufficient where the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence, described as more than a mere scintilla.[49] "The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent."[50] MORESCO II has miserably failed to discharge the onus of proving the validity of Cagalawan's transfer.

	GR No. 198096 2015-07-08	CENTENNIAL TRANSMARINE v. PASTOR M. QUIAMBAO DEL CASTILLO, J.
Moreover, a seaman's entitlement to disability benefits, is governed, not only by medical findings, but by law (the Labor Code) and by contract (the POEA-SEC and the parties' CBA).[42] Here, the POEA-SEC, as provided under Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment, which contains the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing The Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, governs the employment contract between Pastor and petitioners. Section 20(B), paragraph 6 thereof reads:Section 20 (B) - COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
	GR No. 198528 2014-10-13	MAGSAYSAY MITSUI OSK MARINE v. JUANITO G. BENGSON DEL CASTILLO, J.
In many cases decided in the past, this Court has held that cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, and other heart ailments are compensable. Thus, in Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc. v. Balasta,[28] severe 3-vessel coronary artery disease which the seaman contracted while serving as Able Seaman was considered an occupational disease. In Villanueva, Sr. v. Baliwag Navigation, Inc.,[29] it was held that the 2000 POEA-SEC considers heart disease as an occupational disease. In Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Undag,[30] the Court held that hypertensive cardiovascular disease may be a compensable illness, upon proof. In Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. v. Bastol[31] and Heirs of the late Aniban v. National Labor Relations Commission,[32] it was held that myocardial infarction as a disease or cause of death is compensable, such being occupational. Iloreta v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.[33] held that hypertensive cardiovascular disease/coronary artery disease and chronic stable angina are compensable. Micronesia Resources v. Cantomayor[34] stated that a finding of coronary artery disease entitles the claimant a seaman Third Officer to disability compensation. In Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission,[35] the Court held that the claimant a musician on board an ocean-going vessel was entitled to recover for suffering from coronary artery disease. In Sepulveda v. Employees' Compensation Commission,[36] it was declared that the employee's illness, myocardial infarction, was directly brought about by his employment as schoolteacher or was a result of the nature of such employment.
	GR No. 181921 2014-09-17	INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES v. VICTOR M. CREER III DEL CASTILLO, J.
For an illness to be compensable, Section 20(B)(6)[29] of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions), deemed incorporated in the POEA Contract, requires the concurrence of two elements: first, that the illness must be work-related; and second, that the work-related illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.[30]
	GR No. 198097 2014-07-30	STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION v. SPS. MARGARITO B. DELALAMON AND PRISCILA A. DELALAMON REYES, J.
The purpose of the rule is to allow the employer's doctors a reasonable opportunity to assess the seafarer's medical condition in order to determine whether his illness is work-related or not. As explained in Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Undag:[28]
	GR No. 198388 2014-07-28	JORAINA DRAGON TALOSIG v. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES SERENO, C.J.
In other words, the claimant must not merely rely on the disputable presumption, but must be able to present no less than substantial evidence to support her claim. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It must reach the level of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.[19]
	GR No. 193047 2014-03-03	FIL-PRIDE SHIPPING COMPANY v. EDGAR A. BALASTA DEL CASTILLO, J.
Just the same, in several cases, cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, as well as other heart ailments were held to be compensable.[33] Likewise, petitioners failed to refute respondent's allegations in his Position Paper that in the performance of his duties as Able Seaman, he inhaled, was exposed to, and came into direct contact with various injurious and harmful chemicals, dust, fumes/ emissions, and other irritant agents; that he performed strenuous tasks such as lifting, pulling, pushing and/or moving equipment and materials on board the ship; that he was constantly exposed to varying temperatures of extreme hot and cold as the ship crossed ocean boundaries; that he was exposed as well to harsh weather conditions; that in most instances, he was required to perform overtime work; and that the work of an Able Seaman is both physically and mentally stressful. It does not require much imagination to realize or conclude that these tasks could very well cause the illness that respondent, then already 47 years old, suffered from six months into his employment contract with petitioners. The following pronouncement in a recent case very well applies to respondent: x x x His constant exposure to hazards such as chemicals and the varying temperature, like the heat in the kitchen of the vessel and the coldness outside, coupled by stressful tasks in his employment caused, or at least aggravated, his illness. It is already recognized that any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally resulting in wear and tear of the human body.[34]
	GR No. 188595 2013-08-28	SEA POWER SHIPPING ENTERPRISES v. NENITA P. SALAZAR SERENO, C.J.
In fulfilling these requisites, respondent must present no less than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It must reach the level of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.[32]
	GR No. 179607 2013-07-24	CIRILA MANOTA v. AVANTGARDE SHIPPING CORPORATION PERALTA, J.
Petitioners' admission that no symptoms of Enrique's illness had manifested at the time of his arrival in the Philippines revealed that he indeed was not suffering of any ailment then, and was even in good health upon his arrival which even bolstered our earlier findings that he was repatriated due to the completion of his employment contract and not due to any medical reason. Moreover, the post-employment medical examination within 3 days from Enrique's arrival is required in order to ascertain his physical condition, since to ignore the rule would set a precedent with negative repercussions because it would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits.[31] It would certainly be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's illness considering the passage of time.[32] In such a case, the employers would have no protection against unrelated disability claims.[33]
	GR No. 195518 2013-03-20	MAGSAYSAY MARITIME SERVICES v. EARLWIN MEINRAD ANTERO F. LAUREL MENDOZA, J.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, two elements must concur for an injury or illness of a seafarer to be compensable. First, the injury or illness must be work-related; and second, that the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.[25] Both requisites obtain in this case.
	GR No. 175491 2012-12-10	CREW v. JINA T. SORIA MENDOZA, J.
The rule is that, in labor cases, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. The oft-repeated rule is that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.[26] Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegations cannot stand as it will offend due process.[27]
	GR No. 187337 2012-12-05	LOADSTAR INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING v. HEIRS OF LATE ENRIQUE C. CALAWIGAN PEREZ, J.
Time and again, we have ruled that self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence.[31] Often described as more than a mere scintilla,[32] substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.[33] To our mind, Calawigan's unsubstantiated assertion that he requested for a post-employment medical examination from LISI does not even come close to approximating the foregoing quantum of proof. Given that compliance with said requirement is mandatory and the unexplained omission thereof will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits,[34] the CA clearly erred when it adjudged Calawigan entitled to sickness allowance and permanent disability compensation despite his failure to abide by the procedure outlined under the POEA-SEC. As it would be fairly easy for a physician to determine whether the injury or ailment is work-related within three-days from repatriation, to ignore the requirement would set a precedent with negative repercussions which would open the floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits.[35]
	GR No. 175170 2012-09-05	MISAMIS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE v. VIRGILIO M. CAGALAWAN DEL CASTILLO, J.
When there is doubt between the evidence submitted by the employer and that submitted by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee.[47] This is consistent with the rule that an employer's cause could only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the employee's evidence.[48] Thus, MORESCO II cannot rely on the weakness of Ortiz's certification in order to give more credit to its own evidence. Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are not sufficient where the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence, described as more than a mere scintilla.[49] "The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent."[50] MORESCO II has miserably failed to discharge the onus of proving the validity of Cagalawan's transfer.

JEBSENS MARITIME INC. v. ENRIQUE UNDAG