This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2012-10-11 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Petitioner argues that the correct formulation of the issue is not whether there was a perfected contract between the parties during the period of prohibition, but whether by such deed of conditional sale there was "alienation or encumbrance" within the contemplation of the law. This is wrong. The prohibition does not distinguish between consummated and executory sale. The conditional sale entered into by the parties is still a conveyance of the homestead patent. As correctly ruled by the CA, citing Ortega v. Tan:[14] | |||||
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2010-02-25 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is predicated on public policy. Its violation gives rise to the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land and its improvements to the government at the instance of the latter.[20] The provision that "nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of the five-year period" is mandatory[21] and any sale made in violation of such provision is void[22] and produces no effect whatsoever, just like what transpired in this case. Clearly, it is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve.[23] | |||||