This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2010-07-07 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The Agapay and Yaptinchay cases, as well as the cases of Litam v. Rivera[91] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[92] cited in the Yaptinchay case, all arose from actions for reconveyance; while the instant Petitions stemmed from an action for quieting of title. The Court may have declared in previous cases that an action for reconveyance is in the nature of an action for quieting of title,[93] but the two are distinct remedies. | |||||
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2008-11-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Rivera[50] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[51] and Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga[52] cited in Solivio. We ruled thus:The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heirs has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased. | |||||
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2008-04-10 |
PUNO, CJ. |
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| In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue to recover the said property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition,[18] or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto,[19] this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is "within the exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding." [20] In the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[21] the Court had the occasion to clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.[22] In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the "Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations therein reveals that the right being asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in the documents the respondents sought to annul. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the case of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del Rosario[23] is applicable in the case at bar. In the said case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation on the ground that the subject properties rightfully belong to the petitioners' predecessor and by virtue of succession have passed on to them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled: | |||||