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VIRGINIA MARAHAY v. MENELEO C. MELICOR

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR NO. 148600 2009-07-07	ATTY. EMMANUEL PONTEJOS v. ANIANO A DESIERTO LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.[12]
	GR No. 170281 2008-01-18	REPUBLIC v. GLASGOW CREDIT CORONA, J.
In Marahay v. Melicor,[18] this Court ruled:While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss. (emphasis supplied)
	GR No. 168747 2007-10-19	VICTORIA REGNER v. CYNTHIA R. LOGARTA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is well to quote the doctrine laid in Padua v. Ericta,[33] as accentuated in the subsequent case Marahay v. Melicor[34]:Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and determination of causes. It should be their constant effort to assure that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge. It goes without saying, however, that discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full and free presentation of evidence by all the parties, especially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any part. The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment.
	GR NO. 141860 2006-08-31	MALAYAN INSURANCE CO. v. ANCHOR ORIENT LINES-SINGAPORE TINGA, J.
In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.[42]
	GR NO. 169177 2006-06-30	SPS. DAN T. PAGUIRIGAN AND MARY JANE PAGUIRIGAN v. PILHINO SALES CORPORATION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
In this case, the dismissal was based solely on respondent's absence during the pre-trial conference on December 16, 2003. A single instance of non-appearance at the pre-trial due to medical reasons does not amount to willful disregard of the orders of the lower court and will not justify the dismissal of the complaint. That respondent vigorously prosecuted the case before Branch 210 was not contested by petitioners. Likewise, the Court of Appeals noted that respondent had not manifested a lack of interest to prosecute. In fact, respondent's counsel was present at all the previously scheduled pre-trial conferences. Moreover, the cancellations, re-settings and delays were not caused by respondent's inordinate refusal or laxity in prosecuting the case. In Marahay v. Melicor,[18] we ruled that:While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
	GR NO. 161379 2005-08-11	MA. TERESA BELONIO v. RICHARD RODRIGUEZ CALLEJO, SR., J.
Prefatorily, the remedy of the petitioner from the assailed final order of the RTC was to appeal the same via a writ of error under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper only if the aggrieved party has no plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, the CA, in the broader interest of justice, resolved the petition on its merits instead of dismissing it outright, and cannot be faulted for so doing. Indeed, in Marahay v. Melicor,[41] this Court held that:Before resolving said issue, it would be judicious to first clear the air of any misconception as to the procedural propriety of giving due course to this petition. An order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order. If it is erroneous, ordinarily the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal; hence, the same cannot be assailed by certiorari.