This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2014-08-12 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The petitioners added that the status and applicability of the generally accepted principles of international law within the Philippine jurisdiction would be uncertain without the Incorporation Clause, and that the clause implied that the general international law forms part of Philippine law only insofar as they are expressly adopted; that in its rulings in The Holy See, v. Rosario, Jr.[5] and U.S. v. Guinto[6] the Court has said that international law is deemed part of the Philippine law as a consequence of Statehood; that in Agustin v. Edu,[7] the Court has declared that a treaty, though not yet ratified by the Philippines, was part of the law of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that by virtue of the Incorporation Clause, the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnes obligations arising from the jus cogens norms embodied in the laws of war and humanity that include the principle of the imprescriptibility of war crimes; that the crimes committed against petitioners are proscribed under international human rights law as there were undeniable violations of jus cogens norms; that the need to punish crimes against the laws of humanity has long become jus cogens norms, and that international legal obligations prevail over national legal norms; that the Court's invocation of the political doctrine in the instant case is misplaced; and that the Chief Executive has the constitutional duty to afford redress and to give justice to the victims of the comfort women system in the Philippines.[8] | |||||
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2003-02-11 |
VITUG, J. |
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| The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit[20] and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity.[21] If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.[22] The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.[23] | |||||