This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2008-09-16 |
BRION, J. |
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| (a) the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] dated May 26, 2004[2] dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner and affirming the Decision dated November 4, 2002[3] (November 4, 2002 Decision) and the Order dated February 12, 2003[4] (February 12, 2003 Order) of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman); the Ombudsman's Decision and Order found the petitioner administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of official duties as Chairperson of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) Accreditation Committee on Drug Testing, and imposed on her the penalty of reprimand; and | |||||
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2006-07-14 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| This issue is being raised by RBSI for the first time on appeal and only belatedly in its memorandum before this Court. Well-settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[25] An issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[26] Thus, we cannot bend backwards to examine this issue raised by RBSI at this late stage in the proceedings. | |||||
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2005-02-11 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| That the deed was notarized on March 19, 1986, is further proven by the entry in the notarial register. A notarial register is prima facie evidence of the facts there stated.[20] It has the presumption of regularity and to contradict the veracity of the entry, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.[21] Here, respondent had not been able to successfully assail the veracity of the entry. He contended that it was not in his handwriting, but he himself had declared that his clerk made the entries in the register for him, thus revealing why the entry was not in his handwriting.[22] | |||||
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2003-10-07 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Petitioner raises for the first time in its Memorandum the issue of the alleged noncompliance with the publication requirement, which must first be met before the assailed Circulars can be deemed valid. This argument is improper at this stage. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court need not be -- and ordinarily will not be -- considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[22] Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint or in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.[23] | |||||
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2003-09-22 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Second, recall that the date May 25, 1986, which the court a quo accepted as the date of the sale was contained in a notarized instrument. In so doing, the appellate court merely applied the rule of long standing that a public document executed and attested through the intervention of a notary public is evidence of the facts in a clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed.[11] Otherwise stated, public or notarial documents, or those instruments duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.[12] In order to contradict the presumption of regularity of a public document, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.[13] Such evidence is wanting in this case. | |||||