This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2007-09-12 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[6] | |||||
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2006-11-16 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In this case, respondent admitted that he did not attend the January 6, 2003 hearing despite being notified by the court. His claim that he was already discharged as counsel as early as October 25, 2002 is negated by the record that he withdrew his appearance only on March 5, 2003. Until his dismissal or withdrawal was made of record, any judicial notice sent to him was binding upon his client even though as between them the professional relationship may have been terminated.[13] Thus, unless properly relieved, respondent is responsible for the conduct of the cases and his failure to attend the hearing and comply with the trial court's directive to file a formal offer of evidence constitute inexcusable negligence. | |||||
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2006-01-31 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Ordinarily, until his dismissal or withdrawal is made of record in court, any judicial notice sent to a counsel of record is binding upon his client even though as between them the professional relationship may have been terminated.[37] However, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, Atty. Orias, Jr. was negligent in not adequately protecting petitioner's interest, which necessarily calls for a liberal construction of the Rules. Verily, the negligence of Atty. Orias, Jr. cannot be deemed as negligence of petitioner itself in the present case. A notice to a lawyer who appears to have been unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as notice to his client.[38] Thus, petitioner is deemed to have filed its petition for review on certiorari within the reglementary period as alleged in its Reply. | |||||
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2003-03-20 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| The respondent attorney in Aromin v. Boncavil was found to have violated Canons 15, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[22] He was suspended for six (6) months and warned that a repetition of a similar offense would be dealt with more severely. | |||||