This case has been cited 21 times or more.
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2016-01-12 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| The petitions[1] before this Court question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.). Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with the U.S.,[2] claiming that the instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions.[3] In reply, respondents argue that petitioners lack standing to bring the suit. To support the legality of their actions, respondents invoke the 1987 Constitution, treaties, and judicial precedents.[4] | |||||
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2016-01-12 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the best available information and can decide with decisiveness, x x x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.[17] | |||||
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2016-01-12 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| Previously, treaties under the 1973 Constitution required ratification by a majority of the Batasang Pambansa,[19] except in instances wherein the President "may enter into international treaties or agreements as the national welfare and interest may require."[20] This left a large margin of discretion that the President could use to bypass the Legislature altogether. This was a departure from the 1935 Constitution, which explicitly gave the President the power to enter into treaties only with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.[21] The 1987 Constitution returned the Senate's power[22] and, with it, the legislative's traditional role in foreign affairs.[23] | |||||
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2011-07-06 |
SERENO, J. |
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| Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a petition for certiorari may be filed when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law". The "plain" and "adequate remedy" referred to in Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision. [30] Thus, it is a well-settled rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. [31] The purpose of this rule is to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself. [32] However, this requirement is not an ironclad rule. The prior filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with if petitioners are able to show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so. [33] The Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and take cognizance of the petition if it raises an issue of paramount importance and constitutional significance. [34] Thus: True, we had, on certain occasions, entertained direct recourse to this Court as an exception to the rule on hierarchy of courts. In those exceptional cases, however, we recognized an exception because it was dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy. [35] | |||||
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2011-02-01 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it has been recognized that, in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who actually sue in the public interest.[18] Consequently, in a catena of cases,[19] this Court has invariably adopted a liberal stance on locus standi. | |||||
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2009-12-14 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[39] A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.[40] He must also prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract.[41] In other words, for a taxpayer's suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.[42] | |||||
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2009-02-11 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the VFA. This was in Bayan v. Zamora,[4] brought by Bayan, one of petitioners in the present cases. | |||||
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2009-02-11 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| In Bayan v. Zamora, the majority of the Court anchored the validity of the VFA on the flabby conclusion that it was recognized as a treaty by the U.S. The Court held that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. It was held that "it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty."[27] | |||||
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2007-08-15 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| Only a person who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or entitled to the avails of the suit can file a complaint or petition.[47] Respondents claim that petitioner is not a proper party-in-interest as he was unable to show that "he has sustained or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct and personal injury as a result of the execution and enforcement of the assailed contracts or agreements."[48] Moreover, they assert that not all government contracts can justify a taxpayer's suit especially when no public funds were utilized in contravention of the Constitution or a law. | |||||
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2006-05-03 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| (2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[53] wherein the Court held that "given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review" of the Visiting Forces Agreement; | |||||
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2005-07-29 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Anent the claim on lack of legal standing, respondents argue that petitioners, being mere suppliers of the local retailers operating outside the special economic zones, do not stand to suffer direct injury in the enforcement of the issuances being assailed herein. Assuming this is true, this Court has nevertheless held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.[6] | |||||
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2005-02-17 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones.[24] Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary. | |||||
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2004-11-25 |
TINGA, J, |
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| A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.[31] | |||||
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2004-11-25 |
TINGA, J, |
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| The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O. 124 signed and approved by President Aquino in her residual legislative powers is of no moment. It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one.[90] Lex specialis derogant generali. As this Court expressed in the case of Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[91] "another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general statute and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail." | |||||
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2004-02-03 |
TINGA, J, |
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| These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.[27] That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.[28] No such illegal disbursement is alleged. | |||||
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2004-01-21 |
PUNO, J. |
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| These arguments are not difficult to deflect. The determination of whether a person may institute an action or become a party to a suit brings to fore the concepts of real party in interest, capacity to sue and standing to sue. To the legally discerning, these three concepts are different although commonly directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action.[8] As defined in the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[9] Capacity to sue deals with a situation where a person who may have a cause of action is disqualified from bringing a suit under applicable law or is incompetent to bring a suit or is under some legal disability that would prevent him from maintaining an action unless represented by a guardian ad litem. Legal standing is relevant in the realm of public law. In certain instances, courts have allowed private parties to institute actions challenging the validity of governmental action for violation of private rights or constitutional principles.[10] In these cases, courts apply the doctrine of legal standing by determining whether the party has a direct and personal interest in the controversy and whether such party has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of, a standard which is distinct from the concept of real party in interest.[11] Measured by this yardstick, the application of the doctrine on legal standing necessarily involves a preliminary consideration of the merits of the case and is not purely a procedural issue.[12] | |||||
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2003-04-29 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The reasons proffered by respondent judge, i.e., that he had to hear cases in the other courts, will not excuse his delay in deciding Civil Case No. 1110.[6] If he felt that he could not decide the case within the reglementary period, he should have asked for a reasonable extension of time to decide the same.[7] | |||||
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2003-04-11 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Even as a taxpayer, petitioner does not stand "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit." Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government.[8] It bears stressing that "a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds from taxation."[9] The issue in this case is whether respondents' services were illegally terminated. Clearly, it does not involve the illegal disbursement of public funds, hence, petitioner's action cannot be considered a taxpayer's suit. | |||||
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2001-03-26 |
BUENA, J. |
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| In Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora and related cases,[22] we enunciated that the Court's function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is "merely (to) check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing...(of) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power... It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error."[23] | |||||