This case has been cited 6 times or more.
|
2007-02-21 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| As we have previously held in People v. Serrano, Sr.:[36] A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.[37] In People v. Velasco,[38] we stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. Hence, it cannot be disputed that the verdict of the Court of Appeals acquitting Ramon Galicia is now final and irreviewable.[39] | |||||
|
2005-10-25 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Respondent's claim that he gave due course to the appeal in the exercise of judicial activism is mere afterthought. A second look at his order clearly shows his ignorance of the well-settled rule categorically prohibiting appeals from judgments of acquittals.[27] Respondent said that the notice of appeal "is filed within the reglementary period" and that "at least for that reason, the same is given due course." His interpretation of the rule is without any basis in law. When the law is clear and basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it. Anything less than that constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[28] Judges sit as the embodiment of the people's sense of justice, their last recourse where all other institutions have failed, so much so that a judge's ignorance cannot be allowed to erode the people's belief in the justice system. | |||||
|
2004-11-19 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
| In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr.,[31] we ruled that "good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge." In this case, reprimand was considered an appropriate penalty. In People vs. Serrano, Sr.,[32] respondent Judge Pepe P. Domael allowed an appeal from a judgment of acquittal. Although the accused did not object to the appeal interposed by the prosecution, we held that respondent Judge Domael should have known that granting such appeal would constitute double jeopardy. However, since the acts in question were not shown to be tainted with bad faith, fraud, or malice, they were not considered as so gross to warrant the dismissal of respondent judge from the service. | |||||
|
2001-02-15 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
||||
| However, there is an important aspect to this case which was heretofore not considered. The respondent judge's Resolution in question dated March 13, 1997 is one of acquittal. It is well-settled that acquittal in a criminal case is immediately final and executory upon its promulgation; accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy.[10] When the Investigating Justice submitted her Report dated September 7, 1998, the questioned Resolution of respondent judge acquitting Wang was already the subject of a pending petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 128587)[11] which was filed with this Court. It appeared that after the State received a copy of the said Resolution of respondent judge on March 20, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation and Motion" on April 3, 1997 with this Court praying for an extension of thirty (30) days (or until May 4, 1997, a Sunday) within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. The motion was granted by the First Division of this Court in a Resolution dated May 7, 1997. The said petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 128587) which was filed on May 5, 1997 by the Solicitor General together with the Department of Justice, is still pending in this Court. Following established doctrine, the pendency of the appeal is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint.[12] It has also been held that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists.[13] Differently expounded in another case, | |||||
|
2000-12-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| "Observance of the law which he is bound to know and sworn to uphold is required of every judge.[53] When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;[54] anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law."[55] In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[56] | |||||
|
2000-11-06 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| "Observance of the law which he is bound to know and sworn to uphold is required of every judge.[34] When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;[35] anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law."[36] In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[37] | |||||