This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2001-11-29 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We agree with the trial court that the killing of Deguerto was qualified by treachery. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor.[14] As the trial court observed, the two accused, one at each side of the road, waited in ambush before suddenly stabbing and hacking their unsuspecting and defenseless victims, resulting in the death of Deguerto and causing injuries to Palpal-latoc. | |||||
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2000-05-04 |
PARDO, J. |
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| We have consistently held that in invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to accused to prove all the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[13] He must rely on the strength of his own evidence, and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.[14] | |||||
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2000-04-19 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| The invocation of self-defense is an admission of the killing and of its authorship. By this admission, the burden of proof shifts to the accused who must now establish with clear and convincing evidence all the elements of this justifying circumstance, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self- defense.[16] In proving these elements, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence. He can no longer assail the weakness of the evidence against him simply because it cannot be disbelieve after his open admission of responsibility for the killing.[17] | |||||
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2000-02-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Appellant claims that the prosecution could not attribute any motive for the killing. We have laid down the rule that where a reliable eyewitness has fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony, motive becomes immaterial in the successful prosecution of a criminal case.[19] Thus, whether or not appellant had a reason to take part in the killing, his conviction may still follow from the untraversed identification made by prosecution witness Vasquez. It is settled that motive is not essential for conviction for a crime when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit, and that lack of motive for committing the crime does not preclude conviction for such crime when the crime and participation of the accused are definitely proved.[20] | |||||