Lawyerly

GR No. 183387

2009-09-29

PERALTA, J.

Compromise agreements are contracts, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to resolve their differences,[40] thus, avoiding litigation,[41] or put an end to one already commenced.[42]

GR No. 174011

2008-04-14

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. ANGELES URGELLO TONGOY

CORONA, J.

The indisputable certainty in the present case is that there was a prior promise by the predecessor of the respondent that the expropriated properties may be recovered by the former owners once the airport is transferred to Mactan, Cebu. In fact, the witness for the respondent testified that 15 lots were already reconveyed to their previous owners.[18] MCIAA v. CA[19] and ATO v. Gopuco[20] cited by petitioners are not applicable here. In MCIAA, the previous owner failed to prove that there was a compromise settlement.[21] In ATO, the previous owner was not a party to the compromise agreements.[22]

GR No. 151413

2008-02-13

CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORPORATION v. CIR

VELASCO JR., J.

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping;[9] in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an "employment specialist" who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the company;[10] in Novelty Philippines, Inc., v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate;[11] and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board's authorization.[12]

GR NO. 158563

2006-06-30

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. (Fort Wayne vs. Lake Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 558; 18 L.R.A., 367.) (Emphases Supplied)[23] Did the judgment of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 vest absolute and unconditional title in the government? We have already had occasion to rule on this matter in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,[24] which is a related action for reconveyance of a parcel of land also subject of the expropriation proceedings in Civil Case No. R-1881. One of the landowners affected by the said proceeding was Virginia Chiongbian, to whom the CFI ordered the Republic of the Philippines to pay P34,415.00, with legal interest computed from the time the government began using her land. Like the herein respondent, she did not appeal from the CFI's judgment. Also like Gopuco, she eventually filed for the reconveyance of her property when the airport closed. Although she was upheld by both the RTC of Cebu and the Court of Appeals, on appeal we held that "the terms of the judgment (in Civil Case No. R-1881) are clear and unequivocal and granted title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport."[25] Moreover, we held that although other lot owners were able to successfully reacquire their lands by virtue of a compromise agreement, since CHIONGBIAN was not a party to any such agreement, she could not validly invoke the same.

GR NO. 158563

2006-06-30

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

As to respondent's first and second arguments, we have time and again ruled that a compromise agreement, when not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, is a valid contract which is the law between the parties.[26] It is a contract perfected by mere consent,[27] whereby the parties, making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties,[28] and courts will not relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be unwise.[29] Note that respondent has not shown that any of the compromise agreements were in any way tainted with illegality, irregularity or imprudence. Indeed, anyone who is not a party to a contract or agreement cannot be bound by its terms, and cannot be affected by it.[30] Since Gopuco was not a party to the compromise agreements, he cannot legally invoke the same.[31]

GR NO. 156273

2005-08-09

HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO v. MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Aggrieved, the respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). On December 20, 2001, the CA reversed the trial court's decision on the premise that the judgment affirming the state's right to exercise its power of eminent domain was unconditional. In maintaining a contrary view, the CA cited Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,[23] which held that when a land has been acquired for public use unconditionally and in fee simple, the previous owner retains no right in the land and the title obtained will not, in any way, be impaired. Another case relied upon by the appellate court was Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals[24] which is allegedly stare decisis to the case to prevent the exercise of the right of repurchase as the former dealt with a parcel of land similarly expropriated under Civil Case No. R-1881; hence, the same questions relating to the same event have already been previously litigated and decided by a competent court.

GR No. 158563

2005-06-30

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. (Fort Wayne vs. Lake Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 558; 18 L.R.A., 367.) (Emphases Supplied)[23] Did the judgment of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 vest absolute and unconditional title in the government? We have already had occasion to rule on this matter in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,[24] which

GR No. 158563

2005-06-30

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

contract perfected by mere consent,[27] whereby the parties, making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties,[28] and courts will not relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be unwise.[29] Note that respondent has not shown that any of the compromise agreements were in any way tainted with illegality, irregularity or imprudence. Indeed, anyone who is not a party to a contract or agreement cannot be bound by its terms, and cannot be affected by it.[30] Since Gopuco was not a party to the compromise agreements, he cannot legally invoke the same.[31] Lastly, Gopuco argues that there is present, in cases of expropriation, an "implied contract" that the properties will be used only for the public purpose for which they were acquired. No such contract exists.

GR NO. 137549

2005-02-11

AURELIO P. ALONZO v. JAIME

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Compromise agreements are contracts, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to resolve their differences[43] thus avoiding litigation,[44] or put an end to one already commenced.[45]

GR No. 147349

2004-02-13

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. ALA INDUSTRIES CORPORATION

PANGANIBAN, J.

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions to resolve their differences,[9] thus avoiding litigation[10] or putting an end to one that has already commenced.[11] Generally favored in law,[12] such agreement is a bilateral act or transaction that is binding on the contracting parties and is expressly acknowledged by the Civil Code as a juridical agreement between them.[13] Provided it is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy,[14] it is immediately executory.[15]

GR No. 156273

2003-10-15

HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO v. MACTAN - CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY

BELLOSILLO, J.

The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport. CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan-Cebu International Airport vs. Court of Appeals wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation proceedings but a contract of sale x x x x To permit CHIONGBIAN to prove the existence of a compromise settlement which she claims to have entered into with the Republic of the Philippines prior to the rendition of judgment in the expropriation case would result in a modification of the judgment of a court which has long become final and executory x x x x And even assuming for the sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN could prove the existence of the alleged written agreement acknowledging her right to repurchase Lot No. 941 through parol evidence, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence presented by CHIONGBIAN was admissible x x x x Aside from being inadmissible under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, [the] testimonies are also inadmissible for being hearsay in nature x x x x[29]

	GR No. 183387 2009-09-29	SIMEON M. VALDEZ v. FINANCIERA MANILA PERALTA, J.
Compromise agreements are contracts, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to resolve their differences,[40] thus, avoiding litigation,[41] or put an end to one already commenced.[42]
	GR No. 174011 2008-04-14	AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. ANGELES URGELLO TONGOY CORONA, J.
The indisputable certainty in the present case is that there was a prior promise by the predecessor of the respondent that the expropriated properties may be recovered by the former owners once the airport is transferred to Mactan, Cebu. In fact, the witness for the respondent testified that 15 lots were already reconveyed to their previous owners.[18] MCIAA v. CA[19] and ATO v. Gopuco[20] cited by petitioners are not applicable here. In MCIAA, the previous owner failed to prove that there was a compromise settlement.[21] In ATO, the previous owner was not a party to the compromise agreements.[22]
	GR No. 151413 2008-02-13	CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORPORATION v. CIR VELASCO JR., J.
In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping;[9] in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an "employment specialist" who had not even presented any proof of her authority to represent the company;[10] in Novelty Philippines, Inc., v. CA, we ruled that a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate;[11] and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board's authorization.[12]
	GR NO. 158563 2006-06-30	AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. (Fort Wayne vs. Lake Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 558; 18 L.R.A., 367.) (Emphases Supplied)[23] Did the judgment of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 vest absolute and unconditional title in the government? We have already had occasion to rule on this matter in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,[24] which is a related action for reconveyance of a parcel of land also subject of the expropriation proceedings in Civil Case No. R-1881. One of the landowners affected by the said proceeding was Virginia Chiongbian, to whom the CFI ordered the Republic of the Philippines to pay P34,415.00, with legal interest computed from the time the government began using her land. Like the herein respondent, she did not appeal from the CFI's judgment. Also like Gopuco, she eventually filed for the reconveyance of her property when the airport closed. Although she was upheld by both the RTC of Cebu and the Court of Appeals, on appeal we held that "the terms of the judgment (in Civil Case No. R-1881) are clear and unequivocal and granted title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport."[25] Moreover, we held that although other lot owners were able to successfully reacquire their lands by virtue of a compromise agreement, since CHIONGBIAN was not a party to any such agreement, she could not validly invoke the same.
	GR NO. 158563 2006-06-30	AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As to respondent's first and second arguments, we have time and again ruled that a compromise agreement, when not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, is a valid contract which is the law between the parties.[26] It is a contract perfected by mere consent,[27] whereby the parties, making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties,[28] and courts will not relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be unwise.[29] Note that respondent has not shown that any of the compromise agreements were in any way tainted with illegality, irregularity or imprudence. Indeed, anyone who is not a party to a contract or agreement cannot be bound by its terms, and cannot be affected by it.[30] Since Gopuco was not a party to the compromise agreements, he cannot legally invoke the same.[31]
	GR NO. 156273 2005-08-09	HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO v. MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY CALLEJO, SR., J.
Aggrieved, the respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). On December 20, 2001, the CA reversed the trial court's decision on the premise that the judgment affirming the state's right to exercise its power of eminent domain was unconditional. In maintaining a contrary view, the CA cited Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan,[23] which held that when a land has been acquired for public use unconditionally and in fee simple, the previous owner retains no right in the land and the title obtained will not, in any way, be impaired. Another case relied upon by the appellate court was Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals[24] which is allegedly stare decisis to the case to prevent the exercise of the right of repurchase as the former dealt with a parcel of land similarly expropriated under Civil Case No. R-1881; hence, the same questions relating to the same event have already been previously litigated and decided by a competent court.
	GR No. 158563 2005-06-30	AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. (Fort Wayne vs. Lake Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 558; 18 L.R.A., 367.) (Emphases Supplied)[23] Did the judgment of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 vest absolute and unconditional title in the government? We have already had occasion to rule on this matter in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,[24] which
	GR No. 158563 2005-06-30	AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
contract perfected by mere consent,[27] whereby the parties, making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties,[28] and courts will not relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be unwise.[29] Note that respondent has not shown that any of the compromise agreements were in any way tainted with illegality, irregularity or imprudence. Indeed, anyone who is not a party to a contract or agreement cannot be bound by its terms, and cannot be affected by it.[30] Since Gopuco was not a party to the compromise agreements, he cannot legally invoke the same.[31] Lastly, Gopuco argues that there is present, in cases of expropriation, an "implied contract" that the properties will be used only for the public purpose for which they were acquired. No such contract exists.
	GR NO. 137549 2005-02-11	AURELIO P. ALONZO v. JAIME CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Compromise agreements are contracts, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to resolve their differences[43] thus avoiding litigation,[44] or put an end to one already commenced.[45]
	GR No. 147349 2004-02-13	MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. ALA INDUSTRIES CORPORATION PANGANIBAN, J.
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions to resolve their differences,[9] thus avoiding litigation[10] or putting an end to one that has already commenced.[11] Generally favored in law,[12] such agreement is a bilateral act or transaction that is binding on the contracting parties and is expressly acknowledged by the Civil Code as a juridical agreement between them.[13] Provided it is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy,[14] it is immediately executory.[15]
	GR No. 156273 2003-10-15	HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO v. MACTAN - CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY BELLOSILLO, J.
The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport. CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan-Cebu International Airport vs. Court of Appeals wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation proceedings but a contract of sale x x x x To permit CHIONGBIAN to prove the existence of a compromise settlement which she claims to have entered into with the Republic of the Philippines prior to the rendition of judgment in the expropriation case would result in a modification of the judgment of a court which has long become final and executory x x x x And even assuming for the sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN could prove the existence of the alleged written agreement acknowledging her right to repurchase Lot No. 941 through parol evidence, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence presented by CHIONGBIAN was admissible x x x x Aside from being inadmissible under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, [the] testimonies are also inadmissible for being hearsay in nature x x x x[29]

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. CA