This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2009-01-20 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Q: Was Benedicto [Felicidario, Jr.] armed with any weapon at that time? A: Yes, sir, he was armed. Q: With what kind of instrument? A: A bolo. Q: What about Fernando Sameniano, what did you observe from him? A: This Fernando Sameniano was the one who chased me. Q: Tell us, what did you do when these people attacked your cousin? A: I [ran] away because they were able to take our bolo. Q: You said, you [ran] away and you were chased by Fernando Sameniano, where did you go in running away? A: I [ran] towards the abaca plantation. Q: Was Fernando Sameniano able to catch up with you? A: No, sir. Q: And when Fernando Sameniano was not able to catch up with you, where did you go? A: I went home. Q: And you were able to finally arrive home that evening? A: Yes, sir. Q: And when you arrived home, what did you do? A: I told the wife of Roberto delos Santos that we were attacked in our hut.[9] The testimony of the eyewitness was direct, clear, and candid. He was able to identify the three accused, including accused-appellant, as the assailants. He was familiar with accused-appellant even before the incident, and on the night in question, he was only at arm's length from the three attackers. Furthermore, his testimony was consistent with the medico-legal report that showed the location and nature of the wounds in Roberto's face. A detailed testimony, like Norming's, acquires greater weight and credibility when confirmed by autopsy findings.[10] Lastly, no ill motive was shown that could impeach his credibility. Where there is no evidence showing devious reasons or improper motives why a prosecution witness would falsely testify against or implicate an accused in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.[11] Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to support a conviction, even in a charge of murder.[12] | |||||
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2003-01-28 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In People vs. Reyes,[54] however, the Court held that once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance. The sound of a person's voice is an acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years.[55] | |||||
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2001-10-26 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In People vs. Reyes,[17] we held that once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance. In a number of cases, we ruled that the sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years.[18] Appellant did not deny that he and Roberta had known each other since childhood[19] and that appellant and Roberta's husband were "barkada."[20] It is not impossible then that complainant could immediately recognize appellant through his voice alone. In addition, appellant's face was very near the victim[21] such that the victim could not have misidentified him, even only by voice recognition. | |||||
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2001-01-16 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| This contention has no merit. It was quite possible for anyone to hear people talking and yet not understand what they are talking about. What is important is that Felicitas recognized accused-appellants by their voices. "The sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years."[27] In the instant case, Felicitas Vallecer explained that she is familiar with accused-appellants' voices because they passed by her house almost everyday. In fact, accused-appellant June Sanayan is married to the sister of Felicitas' husband, Vicente Vallecer.[28] | |||||
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2000-02-16 |
PARDO, J. |
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| We thus affirm the findings of the trial court on the credibility of Delia's narration of her defilement not only because of the settled rule that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect on appeal because it had the opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor and deportment while testifying, but more so because it is unnatural and highly improbable that a young girl would come out with such serious accusation, risking not only her honor and reputation but her family's as well.[17] Delia was only nine (9) years old when she was raped. At such tender age, she could not be expected to weave with uncanny recollection such a complicated tale as the sexual assault that accused-appellant unconscionably perpetrated on her.[18] The revelation of an innocent child, like Delia, whose chastity was abused deserves full credit, as the willingness of the complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint.[19] Thus, testimonies of rape victims who are of tender age demand full credence.[20] "Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity."[21] And the credibility of a rape victim is augmented when, as in this case, she has no malevolent motive to testify against the accused-appellant or where there is absolutely no evidence which even remotely suggests that she could have been actuated by such motive.[22] | |||||