Lawyerly

GR No. 180989

2012-02-07

SERENO, J.

A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.[9] Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the dissipation of public funds through numerous irregularities in government financial transactions. These transactions have allegedly been left unchecked by the lifting of the pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money.

GR No. 176579

2011-06-28

WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES

CARPIO, J.

The Court first encountered the issue on the definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in the case of Fernandez v. Cojuangco, docketed as G.R. No. 157360.[16] That case involved the same public utility (PLDT) and substantially the same private respondents. Despite the importance and novelty of the constitutional issue raised therein and despite the fact that the petition involved a purely legal question, the Court declined to resolve the case on the merits, and instead denied the same for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.[17] There, petitioner Fernandez assailed on a pure question of law the Regional Trial Court's Decision of 21 February 2003 via a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court's Resolution, denying the petition, became final on 21 December 2004.

GR No. 166910

2010-10-19

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD

VELASCO JR., J.

But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse judicial review unless the constitutional question or the assailed illegal government act is brought before it by a party who possesses what in Latin is technically called locus standi or the standing to challenge it.[25] To have standing, one must establish that he has a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."[26] Particularly, he must show that (1) he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[27]

GR No. 188456

2009-09-10

H. HARRY L. ROQUE v. COMELEC

VELASCO JR., J.

It is true, as postulated, that to have standing, one must, as a rule, establish having suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal government conduct; that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[38] The prescription on standing, however, is a matter of procedure. Hence, it may be relaxed, as the Court has often relaxed the rule for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens and taxpayers, when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[39] As we wrote in Chavez v. PCGG,[40] where issues of public importance are presented, there is no necessity to show that the suitor has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the requisite injury is assumed.

GR No. 157870

2008-11-03

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

VELASCO JR., J.

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.[3] But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.[4] To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[5]

GR No. 170516

2008-07-16

AKBAYAN v. AQUINO

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Under both the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, the right to information is self-executory. It is a public right that belongs to and can be invoked by the people. Consequently, every citizen has the "standing" to challenge any violation of the right and may seek its enforcement. [218] The self-executory status and the significance in a democracy of the right of access to information were emphasized by the Court in Gonzales v. Narvasa,[219] viz:Under both the 1973 (footnote omitted) and 1987 Constitutions, this (the right to information) is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts...

GR No. 177271

2007-05-04

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941 v. COMELEC

GARCIA, J.

Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to information enshrined in the self-executory[15] Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

GR NO. 125509

2007-01-31

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER v. VICENTE Q. ROXAS

CARPIO MORALES, J.

More particularly, the taxpayer must establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement[25] or that he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the case, or is entitled to the avails of the suit.[26]

GR NO. 143797

2006-05-04

CARLITO L. MONTES v. CA

As the present petition is one for prohibition which is a preventive remedy, worthy of note is the fact, as manifested by the petitioner himself, that the suspension order has already been implemented on 17 July 2000.[35] The act sought to be enjoined having taken place already, there is nothing more to restrain. Thus, the instant petition has been unmade as a mere subject matter of purely theoretical interest. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.[36]

GR NO. 163818

2005-10-20

SEBASTIAN SERAG v. CA

CALLEJO, SR., J.

On the first issue, we find the contention of the private respondent to be barren of merit. A motion is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead.[28] Courts will not determine a moot question in which no practical relief can be granted.[29] However, the Court will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.[30]

GR NO. 157509

2005-01-18

AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE v. ALBERTO ROMULO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.[10] Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged."[11] For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[12]

GR NO. 157509

2005-01-18

AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE v. ALBERTO ROMULO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As labor unions representing their members, it cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.[13] Thus, only NLRC personnel who may find themselves the subject of the Secretary of Labor's disciplinary authority, conferred by Section 1(d) of the subject executive order, may be said to have a direct and specific interest in raising the substantive issue herein. Moreover, and if at all, only Congress, and not petitioners, can claim any injury[14] from the alleged executive encroachment of the legislative function to amend, modify and/or repeal laws.

GR No. 144935

2004-01-15

DR. MARCELO M. ALMANZOR v. DR. BENITO S. FELIX

QUISUMBING, J.

The issue on improper execution of the penalty consisting of petitioners' suspension is moot. There is sufficient basis for the penalty, which we sustain. Considering the fact that the petitioners are indeed liable for simple misconduct, and that they have served out the penalty as affirmed by TUP Office Order No. 452, s.2000,[14] this Court is constrained from considering an issue that has become academic.[15] Suffice it to stress that no temporary restraining order (TRO) has been issued by this Court, while the appellate court itself had lifted the TRO it issued earlier, paving the way for compliance with the suspension order. As a general rule, courts should not take cognizance of moot and academic questions.[16]

	GR No. 180989 2012-02-07	GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. CHAIRPERSON SERENO, J.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.[9] Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the dissipation of public funds through numerous irregularities in government financial transactions. These transactions have allegedly been left unchecked by the lifting of the pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money.
	GR No. 176579 2011-06-28	WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES CARPIO, J.
The Court first encountered the issue on the definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in the case of Fernandez v. Cojuangco, docketed as G.R. No. 157360.[16] That case involved the same public utility (PLDT) and substantially the same private respondents. Despite the importance and novelty of the constitutional issue raised therein and despite the fact that the petition involved a purely legal question, the Court declined to resolve the case on the merits, and instead denied the same for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.[17] There, petitioner Fernandez assailed on a pure question of law the Regional Trial Court's Decision of 21 February 2003 via a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court's Resolution, denying the petition, became final on 21 December 2004.
	GR No. 166910 2010-10-19	ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD VELASCO JR., J.
But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse judicial review unless the constitutional question or the assailed illegal government act is brought before it by a party who possesses what in Latin is technically called locus standi or the standing to challenge it.[25] To have standing, one must establish that he has a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."[26] Particularly, he must show that (1) he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[27]
	GR No. 188456 2009-09-10	H. HARRY L. ROQUE v. COMELEC VELASCO JR., J.
It is true, as postulated, that to have standing, one must, as a rule, establish having suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal government conduct; that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[38] The prescription on standing, however, is a matter of procedure. Hence, it may be relaxed, as the Court has often relaxed the rule for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens and taxpayers, when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[39] As we wrote in Chavez v. PCGG,[40] where issues of public importance are presented, there is no necessity to show that the suitor has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the requisite injury is assumed.
	GR No. 157870 2008-11-03	SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD VELASCO JR., J.
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.[3] But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.[4] To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[5]
	GR No. 170516 2008-07-16	AKBAYAN v. AQUINO CARPIO MORALES, J.
Under both the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, the right to information is self-executory. It is a public right that belongs to and can be invoked by the people. Consequently, every citizen has the "standing" to challenge any violation of the right and may seek its enforcement. [218] The self-executory status and the significance in a democracy of the right of access to information were emphasized by the Court in Gonzales v. Narvasa,[219] viz:Under both the 1973 (footnote omitted) and 1987 Constitutions, this (the right to information) is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts...
	GR No. 177271 2007-05-04	BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941 v. COMELEC GARCIA, J.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to information enshrined in the self-executory[15] Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
	GR NO. 125509 2007-01-31	PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER v. VICENTE Q. ROXAS CARPIO MORALES, J.
More particularly, the taxpayer must establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement[25] or that he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the case, or is entitled to the avails of the suit.[26]
	GR NO. 143797 2006-05-04	CARLITO L. MONTES v. CA
As the present petition is one for prohibition which is a preventive remedy, worthy of note is the fact, as manifested by the petitioner himself, that the suspension order has already been implemented on 17 July 2000.[35] The act sought to be enjoined having taken place already, there is nothing more to restrain. Thus, the instant petition has been unmade as a mere subject matter of purely theoretical interest. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.[36]
	GR NO. 163818 2005-10-20	SEBASTIAN SERAG v. CA CALLEJO, SR., J.
On the first issue, we find the contention of the private respondent to be barren of merit. A motion is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead.[28] Courts will not determine a moot question in which no practical relief can be granted.[29] However, the Court will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.[30]
	GR NO. 157509 2005-01-18	AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE v. ALBERTO ROMULO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.[10] Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged."[11] For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[12]
	GR NO. 157509 2005-01-18	AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE v. ALBERTO ROMULO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As labor unions representing their members, it cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.[13] Thus, only NLRC personnel who may find themselves the subject of the Secretary of Labor's disciplinary authority, conferred by Section 1(d) of the subject executive order, may be said to have a direct and specific interest in raising the substantive issue herein. Moreover, and if at all, only Congress, and not petitioners, can claim any injury[14] from the alleged executive encroachment of the legislative function to amend, modify and/or repeal laws.
	GR No. 144935 2004-01-15	DR. MARCELO M. ALMANZOR v. DR. BENITO S. FELIX QUISUMBING, J.
The issue on improper execution of the penalty consisting of petitioners' suspension is moot. There is sufficient basis for the penalty, which we sustain. Considering the fact that the petitioners are indeed liable for simple misconduct, and that they have served out the penalty as affirmed by TUP Office Order No. 452, s.2000,[14] this Court is constrained from considering an issue that has become academic.[15] Suffice it to stress that no temporary restraining order (TRO) has been issued by this Court, while the appellate court itself had lifted the TRO it issued earlier, paving the way for compliance with the suspension order. As a general rule, courts should not take cognizance of moot and academic questions.[16]

RAMON A. GONZALES v. ANDRES R. NARVASA