This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| There is "actual malice" or malice in fact[41] when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.[42] The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.[43] | |||||
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2011-03-23 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The questioned portion of the news article, while unfortunately not quite accurate, on its own, is insufficient to establish the element of malice in libel cases. We have held that malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.[29] Malice is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.[30] | |||||
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2009-11-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| [29] Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 238, 254 (1999). | |||||
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2008-08-08 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| In 1987, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre,[60] in almost identical letters dated October 20, 1986 sent to four (4) Justices of the Supreme Court (all members of the First Division), stated among others - | |||||
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2005-12-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages notwithstanding that the same was excessive unconscionable and devoid of any basis. The petitioners argue that this case is one for damages arising from libel, and not one for abuse of rights under the New Civil Code. They further claim the constitutional protections extended by the freedom of speech and of the press clause of the 1987 Constitution against liability for libel, claiming that the article was published in fulfillment of its social and moral duty to inform the public "on matters of general interest, promote the public good and protect the moral [fabric] of the people."[16] They insist that the news article was based on a letter released by the Bureau of Immigration, and is thus a qualifiedly privileged communication. To recover damages, the respondent must prove its publication was attended by actual malice - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.[17] | |||||
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2005-03-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We also hold that the petitioner's and Ramos's failure to present their informant before the court as well as other evidence that would prove Ramos' claim that he had conducted an investigation to verify the information passed on to him should not be taken against them. On this point, we turn to our pronouncement in the case of Rodolfo R. Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[50] to wit:A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said, "public discussion is a political duty" and "the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people."[51] | |||||
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2004-10-19 |
TINGA, J, |
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| To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.[63] | |||||
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2000-03-02 |
BUENA, J. |
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| In the recent case of Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., [14] we ruled that:"The question is whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory, malice can be presumed so that it was incumbent upon petitioner to overcome such presumption. Under Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of is official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends." | |||||