This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2009-09-18 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.[33] If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. | |||||
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2008-10-08 |
TINGA, J. |
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| As for the penalty, the RTC did not err in imposing the penalty of death since the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Neither actual demand for nor payment of ransom is necessary for the consummation of the felony. It is sufficient that the deprivation of liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom even if none of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 were present in its perpetration.[35] The death of the victim as a result of the kidnapping only serves as a generic aggravating circumstance for the rule is that when more than one qualifying circumstances are proven, the others must be considered as generic aggravating circumstances.[36] | |||||
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2007-07-12 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Similarly, the truthfulness of Alamag's testimony is not affected by the alleged inconsistency as to whether she was threatened or not by her uncle (Erdaje). The discrepancy is of such a minor nature that it does not belie the occurrence of the abduction of Kenneth Medina by Cenahonon and Erdaje. In fact, such trivial inconsistencies even serve to strengthen the case of the prosecution as they erase suspicion of a rehearsed or perjured testimony.[38] | |||||
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2007-04-24 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. For appellant to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under the aforequoted provision, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt the following elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual who is not any of the parents of the victim nor a female; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the crime, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.[9] If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is also of no moment and the crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present. | |||||
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2004-02-03 |
PER CURIAM |
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| "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed The elements of the crime defined in Art. 267 above are: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four (4) circumstances mentioned above is present.[130] | |||||
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2003-04-24 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267[69] of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused to effect the same. It is thus essential that the following be established by the prosecution: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in Article 267 be present.[70] But if the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element is no longer necessary.[71] | |||||
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2002-03-12 |
PER CURIAM |
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| WITNESS: Well, he confirmed what Ivonne told us. That Gerry (Bacungay) brought them there and the instruction was just to wait because they were coming back as soon as they got the ransom money (underscoring supplied).[23] It is immaterial that no direct evidence exists on record on the actual payment of the ransom money. After all, actual payment of ransom is not necessary for the crime to be committed, it being enough that there be at least an overt act of demanding ransom from the victim or any other person as in this case.[24] Our pronouncement in People v. Salimbago[25] is relevant - | |||||
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2000-12-14 |
PER CURIAM |
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| For her part, accused-appellant Garalde harps on the fact that the sworn statements of the kidnap victims, specifically that of Dianita, did not contain any inculpatory facts and circumstances linking her to the kidnapping. This omission is not fatal to the prosecution's case against accused-appellant Garalde. As explained by Dianita, she only answered the questions that were asked of her. And the questions propounded to her during the early stages of the criminal investigation mainly related to the identity of the persons who actually abducted them on 9 August 1994. In any case, ex-parte statements are almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.[60] Indeed, the infirmity of the affidavits as evidence is much a matter of judicial cxperience.[61] | |||||