This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-11-26 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Further, by analogy, We have had the occasion to hold that, when a final money judgment ordered the payment of "legal interest" without mention of payment of compound interest, a judge who orders payment of compound interest does so in excess of his authority.[15] As held in Philippine American Accident Insurance v. Flores:[16] | |||||
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2009-03-13 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| We have time and again reiterated the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by injunction.[16] This doctrine of non-interference is premised on the principle that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.[17] As correctly ratiocinated by the CA, cases wherein an execution order has been issued, are still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.[18] Since the Bacolod RTC had already acquired jurisdiction over the collection suit (Civil Case No. 98-10404) and rendered judgment in relation thereto, it retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts over its judgment, including all incidents relative to the control and conduct of its ministerial officers, namely public respondent sheriffs. Thus, the issuance by the Pasig RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 68125 was a clear act of interference with the judgment of Bacolod RTC in Civil Case No. 98-10404. | |||||
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2003-06-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration. If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,[16] we held that the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory[17] and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.[18] In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality. | |||||
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2002-02-27 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| x x x the remedies of certiorari and appeal are not mutually exclusive remedies in certain exceptional cases, such as when there is grave abuse of discretion, or when public welfare so requires. The trial court gravely abused its discretion by setting aside the order x x x which has long become final and executory x x x x Its action was clearly beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final and executory order. x x x x Hence, though an order completely and finally disposes of the case, if appeal is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law or the interest of substantial justice requires, a petition for certiorari may be availed of upon showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Secondly, the subsequent Orders of the HLURB requiring petitioner to pay for the expenses incurred by private respondents in securing the transfer of title in their name do not fall within the ambit of the HLURB Decision whether expressly or by necessary inference, i.e., "whatever then is necessary to be done to carry out the decision should be ordered."[22] The Orders are completely separate from and independent of the Decision and do not merely enforce it as the HLURB and the Court of Appeals would want to impress. The Orders cannot therefore be considered part of the Decision which must be executed against petitioner. Fundamental is the rule that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision;[23] consequently, where the order of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order has pro-tanto no validity.[24] | |||||