This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2015-07-15 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Verily, the fact that there is no decision by the COC to appeal from highlights Petron's failure to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed by law. Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail of all administrative processes afforded him, such that if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought, otherwise, the premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action.[40] While there are exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it has not been sufficiently shown that the present case falls under any of the exceptions. | |||||
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2008-11-27 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. It is disregarded: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) when no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies; and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.[95] | |||||
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2007-04-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| No Cooperative shall borrow money from any source without the Board of Administrator's prior approval: Provided, That the NEA Board of Administrators, may, by appropriate rule or regulation, grant general permission to Cooperative to secure short-term loans not requiring the encumbrance of their real properties or of a substantial portion of their other properties or assets. It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that the clauses, phrases, sections and provisions of a law be read as a whole; never as disjointed or truncated parts,[16] for a law is enacted as a single entity and not by installment of paragraphs here and subsections there.[17] Applying this rule to Section 10, its opening paragraph must be read in relation to the succeeding subsections. The phrase in the opening paragraph ostensibly vesting in the NEA jurisdiction over "all matters" involving electric cooperatives actually pertain to the subjects covered in the succeeding subsections such as the organization of electric cooperatives,[18] rate fixing,[19] loan agreements and fund management. This is a rational understanding of Section 10 for, as specified in the preamble of the law, the primary purpose of the NEA is to ensure total electrification through the administration of funds for the establishment and operation of electric cooperatives. | |||||
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2005-04-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The foregoing notwithstanding, the RTC turned a blind eye to the pleadings of the respondents. The RTC should have dismissed the complaint of the petitioner. The petitioner ought to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial recourse.[51] Based on case law, an action for declaratory relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through other existing forms of actions or proceedings.[52] A petition for a declaratory relief cannot be made a substitute for all existing remedies and should be used with caution.[53] Relief by declaratory judgment is sui generis and not strictly legal or equitable yet its historical affinity is equitable.[54] The remedy is not designed to supplant existing remedies.[55] | |||||
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2005-04-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| ... (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department Secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) when no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies; and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.[26] | |||||
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2004-09-27 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
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| However, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule. It may be disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,[27] (12) when no administrative review is provided by law, (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.[28] | |||||
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2004-06-04 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We find petitioner's contentions bereft of merit. The principle of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is, under the factual circumstances of this case, inapplicable. While this Court has held that before a party is allowed to seek intervention of the courts, it is a pre condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him,[21] nonetheless, said rule is not without exceptions.[22] The doctrine is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of each case.[23] | |||||