This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2015-02-25 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his complaint with substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[9] Further, it is settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function primarily lodged in the Investigating Justice.[10] The findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of the unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.[11] The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases.[12] However, there are some exceptions to the rule according finality to the trial judge's assessment of a witness' testimony, such as when his evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would affect the result of the case.[13] | |||||
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2002-04-19 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Appellant's contention that there was no evidence to show that force was used by appellant simply because complainant did not suffer physical injuries is too worn-out to be of evidentiary value. Absence of scratches, contusions, and hematoma does not negate sexual intercourse without the victim's consent. Presence of hematoma, contusions and the like is not an essential element of the crime. What is imperative is for the prosecution to prove the element of force or intimidation, and here we find sufficient proof that both were actually employed by the accused upon his victim to achieve his end.[22] Not only was complainant forced to the ground, appellant was armed with a knife to impress on his victim his deadly intent to consummate his lust. | |||||
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2001-01-22 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The knife pressed on the upper left breast of the victim while accused appellant was ravishing her which, in fact, left a small scar eloquently bespeaks of the employment of force or intimidation to facilitate the commission of the crime. Be that as it may, the fact that most of the physical injuries sustained by the victim were inflicted after her ravishment will not negate the fact that she was raped. Indeed, the absence of external signs of physical injuries does not prove that rape was not committed, for proof thereof is not an essential element of rape.[43] It must be pointed out in this regard that when accused-appellant struck the complainant's head with a bottle, it was not to facilitate the commission of the offense because he already succeeded in raping the victim but because he was agitated and angry at the whimpering of the latter. He, in fact, struck her again when she screamed. Accused-appellant's later assault on the victim with a kitchen knife was also not on account of facilitating the commission of the felony but because the victim tried to escape.[44] | |||||
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2000-10-16 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Likewise, appellant's proposition that there was no force or intimidation because private complainant did not suffer injuries and her clothes were not torn is preposterous, to say the least. The absence of external signs of physical injuries does not prove that rape was not committed, for proof thereof is not an essential element of the crime of rape. What is imperative is for the prosecution to prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by the accused upon his victim to achieve his end.[19] | |||||
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2000-02-29 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The fate of accused-appellant LAGARTO and CORDERO depends greatly on the credibility of Barlam as a witness. The trial court also recognized this, such that it propounded numerous clarificatory questions throughout the hearings of 3 and 4 October 1994, when Barlam was testifying on the witness stand after her psychiatric examination, just to elucidate her responses amid the sea of queries unleashed by the lawyers. It is in cases like this where we find ourselves adhering more to the principle that factual findings of the trial court must be accorded respect and even finality on appeal because the trial judge had every opportunity to question the witness, hear her testify, and observe her demeanor and deportment.[87] Exceptions to this rule exist, such as when the trial court's evaluation was arbitrarily made, or when some substantial fact or circumstance which might affect the result of the case has been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, but no such peculiarity is apparent in the case at bar.[88] The trial court has "keenly observed (Barlam) during her testimony and is convinced that she is speaking the truth."[89] After poring over the voluminous records of this case and scrutinizing the assailed Decision of 31 January 1995, we see no reason to depart from this conclusion. | |||||