This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2013-03-13 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Consequently, following the subsidiary nature of the remedy of rescission, a creditor would have a cause of action to bring an action for rescission, if it is alleged that the following successive measures have already been taken: (1) exhaust the properties of the debtor through levying by attachment and execution upon all the property of the debtor, except such as are exempt by law from execution; (2) exercise all the rights and actions of the debtor, save those personal to him (accion subrogatoria); and (3) seek rescission of the contracts executed by the debtor in fraud of their rights (accion pauliana).[25] | |||||
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2005-11-29 |
TINGA, J. |
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| That the absence of a party during trial constitutes waiver of his right to present evidence and cross-examine the opponent's witnesses is firmly supported by jurisprudence.[36] Although a defendant who answered the complaint but fails to appear at the scheduled trial cannot be declared in default, the trial, however, may proceed without his presence. And if the absence of a party during the hearing was due to his own fault, he cannot later on complain that he was deprived of his day in court.[37] | |||||
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2004-05-28 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Moreover, the grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice.[13] In other words, we cannot make a finding of grave abuse of discretion simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial of a case rather than postpone the hearing to another day, because of the absence of a party. That the absence of a party during trial constitutes a waiver of his right to present evidence and cross-examine the opponent's witnesses is firmly supported by jurisprudence. To constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to postpone the hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness.[14] | |||||