This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2008-07-23 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| As to the propriety of mandamus as a remedy, petitioners claim it was not their ministerial duty to acknowledge the proprietary, legal or naked ownership of TMBC over PSE Seat No. 29. True, the Court has invariably ruled that generally, the performance of an official act or duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus. However, the Court has also declared that the general rule does not apply in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.[12] These exceptions apply to the present case. As aptly observed by the CA and we quote:It is beyond cavil that the MSE had already recognized the legal or naked ownership of private respondent to MSE Seat No. 97, but for reasons only known to them, the PSE Board of Governors, who are members of the MSE, adamantly refused to recognize the corresponding seat in the PSE. In fact, it is not seriously disputed that MSE Seat No. 97 became PSE Seat No. 29 upon the latter's incorporation. Petitioners' dubious claim that they could not acknowledge the proprietary interest of respondent TMBC over the seat since allegedly even respondent Roberto K. Recio was not a recognized member due to his failure to so apply is belied by the facts. For one thing Mr. Recio was issued a Certificate of Membership by the PSE. For another, Mr. Recio's name has consistently appeared as a member of the PSE in the PSE's Monthly Report. Given these facts, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner's refusal to acknowledge respondent TMBC's proprietary right over PSE Seat No. 29 was grossly unjust and tyrannical and, therefore controllable by the extraordinary writ of mandamus. | |||||
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2007-01-31 |
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| In Angcangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman,[5] the Court found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases. Similarly, in Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman,[6] the Court ruled that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him. In Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan,[7] it was held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the Information filed six years after the initiatory complaint, thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. | |||||
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2007-01-31 |
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| The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation of an accused violates his constitutional right to due process. Thus, in Roque v. Sandiganbayan,[8] the Court, restating the pronouncement in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,[9] held: We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of due process clause, but under the constitutional guaranty of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving [of] unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case. (Emphasis supplied). | |||||