This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2011-12-14 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Similarly, Florencio's subsequent presentation of himself at the police station cannot be considered as a "voluntary surrender" which would mitigate the penalty imposed. "A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a) he acknowledges his guilt or (b) he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture." [44] Here, Florencio cannot be considered to have surrendered voluntarily since his act did not emanate from a natural impulse to admit the killing of Cesario or to save the police officers the effort and expense that would be incurred in his search and incarceration. Although he submitted a medico-legal certificate purportedly to show that his injuries prevented him from immediately surrendering to the authorities, same, however, does not certify as to the period of his incapacity or the period during which he required medical attendance. Thus, there can be no explanation why he surrendered only on April 16, 1998 or 14 days after the commission of the crime. To us, Florencio's surrender was a mere afterthought undeserving of any consideration. Indeed, the failure of Florencio to immediately surrender militates against his claim that he killed Cesario in self-defense and in defense of relatives since an innocent person will not hesitate to take the prompt and necessary action to exonerate himself of the crime imputed to him. | |||||
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2010-09-07 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Evident premeditation was likewise properly appreciated by the trial court, notwithstanding the inadmissibility of Joel de Jesus's extrajudicial confession disclosing in detail the pre-planned ambush of Abadilla, apparently a contract killing in which the perpetrators were paid or expected to receive payment for the job. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Alejo had stressed that as early as 7:30 in the morning of June 13, 1996, he already noticed something unusual going on upon seeing the two (2) lookouts (appellants Joel de Jesus and Lorenzo delos Santos) walking to and fro along Katipunan Avenue infront of the building he was guarding. True enough, they were expecting somebody to pass that way, who was no other than Abadilla driving his Honda Accord. After the lapse of more or less one (1) hour, he already heard successive gunshots, while in his guard post, from the direction of the middle lane where Abadilla's car was surrounded by four (4) men carrying short firearms. All the foregoing disclosed the execution of a pre-conceived plan to kill Abadilla. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[187] | |||||
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2008-03-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The third element of evident premeditation, however, is lacking in the instant case. The span of thirty minutes or half an hour from the time appellant and Petronilla showed their determination to kill Ramon (2:00 in the morning of 28 October 1995) up to the time appellant shot to death Ramon (2:15-2:30 in the morning of 28 October 1995) could not have afforded them full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the consequences of the crime they committed.[56] We have held that the lapse of thirty minutes between the determination to commit a crime and the execution thereof is insufficient for a full meditation on the consequences of the act.[57] | |||||
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2007-08-28 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Nonetheless, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[30] Hence, this Court may go through the records to determine the civil liability of accused-appellant. Moreover, an appeal in a criminal proceeding opens the entire case for review.[31] This includes a review of the indemnity and damages involved.[32] | |||||
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2004-01-15 |
DAVIDE JR., CJ. |
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| Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance. Evident premeditation exists when it is shown that the execution of a criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent. The requisites of evident premeditation are (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.[34] | |||||
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2002-02-06 |
PARDO, J. |
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| Furthermore, the trial court correctly ruled that the attack against the group of Luna Sanchez was evidently premeditated. From the evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellants knew beforehand the victims' activities during the day .of May 13, 1984, such that on several occasion that day, accused-appellants seemed to be tailing the vehicle of the victims, at times overtaking them. At one instance, one of the men on board the accused-appellants' vehicle pointed an armalite rifle in a threatening manner against the victims. The manner the victims were attacked at about 11:00 in the evening of the same day was evidently well planned and coordinated. Despite the lapse of several hours from the time accused-appellants became aware of the victims' presence until the latter passed through the single-laned bridge, accused-appellants did not abandon their resolve to carry out their unlawful design. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceeded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[74] | |||||
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2000-10-04 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| We cannot agree with the prosecution's theory that the 15-minute interval is sufficient time for the accused to coolly reflect on their plan to kill the victim. It has been held in one case that even the lapse of 30 minutes between the determination to commit a crime and the execution thereof is insufficient for full meditation on the consequences of the act.[10] | |||||
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2000-03-07 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As recommended by the OSG, the alternative circumstance of intoxication should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in favor of appellant since it was duly proven that (a) at the time of the commission of the criminal act, he had taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of a certain degree of control and (b) that such intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony.[25] In the absence of proof to the contrary, it will be presumed that intoxication is not habitual but accidental, and the fact that the accused was drunk at the time of the commission of the crime must then be considered as a mitigating circumstance.[26] | |||||