This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2013-04-11 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| It should be noted that this is merely an administrative matter, a bar matter to be specific, where technical rules are not strictly applied. In fact, in administrative cases, there is no rule regarding entry of judgment. Where there is no entry of judgment, finality and immutability do not come into play. On several occasions, the Court has re-opened administrative cases and modified its decisions that had long attained finality in the interest of justice. A recent example is Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo,[43] where the Court lifted the ban against the disqualification of the respondent from re-employment in government. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency,[44] the Court granted clemency so the respondent could transfer to a higher position. In Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita v. Masamayor,[45] the respondent was given judicial clemency for her past administrative offenses so she could apply for a lateral transfer. | |||||
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2013-04-11 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| On January 27, 1999, in Velez v. de Vera,[18] reasoning that the rotation system applied only to the EVP, the Court considered the election of then EVP Leonard De Vera (De Vera), representing the Eastern Mindanao region, as one completing the first rotational cycle and affirmed the election of Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Salazar) of the Bicolandia region as EVP. The Court explained that the rotational cycle would have been completed with the succession of EVP De Vera, representing Eastern Mindanao as IBP-President. For having misappropriated his clients' funds and committing acts inimical to the IBP-BOG and the IBP in general, De Vera was removed as governor of Eastern Mindanao and as EVP, and his removal was affirmed by the Court. | |||||
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2008-10-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-AD,[102] the manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding. | |||||
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2005-05-17 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.[44] Like any other contract, it must comply with the requisite provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.[45] Any compromise agreement which is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights and holds no obligation to any party. It produces no legal effect at all.[46] Considering all these, there can be no other conclusion than that the decision of the RTC on the basis of a compromise agreement where Benedick was recognized as the illegitimate child of Benito, Sr. is null and void. | |||||