This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2009-04-16 |
TINGA, J. |
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| It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had provided his residential address along with his residence and office telephone numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagan's By-Laws requires that the final notice prior to the sale be made solely through the member's mailing address. Clemente cites our aphorism-like pronouncement in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals[15] that "[a] simple telephone call and an ounce of good faith x x x could have prevented this present controversy." That memorable observation is quite apt in this case. | |||||
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2008-09-11 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| A contract of adhesion is so-called because its terms are prepared by only one party, while the other party merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto.[55] A contract of adhesion is just as binding as ordinary contracts. It is true that we have, on occasion, struck down such contracts as void when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se; they are not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent.[56] | |||||
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2006-12-20 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It has been argued that the Supervisor's Agreement is in the nature of a contract of adhesion; but just because it is does not necessarily mean that it is void. A contract of adhesion is so-called because its terms are prepared by only one party while the other party merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto.[27] Such contract is just as binding as ordinary contracts. "It is true that we have, on occasion, struck down such contracts as void when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se and they are not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely, if he adheres, he gives his consent."[28] In the case at bar, there was no indication that respondent Luna was forced to sign the subject agreement. Being of age, financially stable and with vast business experience, she is presumed to have acted with due care and to have signed the assailed contract with full knowledge of its import. Under the premises, it would be difficult to assume that she was morally abused. She was free to reject the agreement if she wanted to. | |||||
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2000-03-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The court also went on to rule in the Ayala case (supra), that since the stipulations in the subject Deed of Restrictions are plain and unambiguous, which leave no room for interpretation, there was no cause for applying the rule on stringent treatment towards contracts of adhesion. Indeed, while ambiguities in a contract of adhesion are to be construed against the party that prepared the same, this rule applies only if the stipulations in such contract are obscure or ambiguous. If the terms thereof are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations control. In the latter case, there would be no need for construction.[4] Coming now to the case at bar, considering that the contract provision in question (paragraph 9) is likewise plain and unambiguous, we also find no occasion to apply the aforesaid treatment called for by petitioners. | |||||