This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2013-09-04 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.[22] The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.[23] The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. | |||||
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2013-02-18 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be determined before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[16] The rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.[17] | |||||
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2009-06-30 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases[12] that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,[13] are:The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. | |||||
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2000-07-31 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| (P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years.[11] The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds."[12] Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.[13] No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,[14] he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question.[15] This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage. | |||||