This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2010-10-11 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| We are not impressed with appellant's argument that his conviction was unwarranted due to the non-presentation of the informant who allegedly told the police that he was a drug pusher. The presentation of an informant is not a requisite in a prosecution for drug cases.[27] "The failure of the prosecution to present the informant does not vitiate its cause as the latter's testimony is not indispensible to a successful prosecution for drug-pushing, since his testimony would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug. Failure of the prosecution to produce the informant in court is of no moment, especially when he is not even the best witness to establish the fact that the buy-bust operation has indeed been conducted."[28] | |||||
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2009-06-22 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Petitioner's contention, that the non-presentation of the confidential informant was fatal, is untenable. The presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the prosecution of drug cases.[34] Police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers, since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court. Moreover, drug dealers do not look kindly upon squealers and informants. It is understandable why, as much as permitted, their identities are kept secret.[35] | |||||
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2008-07-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The presentation of an informant is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases.[45] The failure of the prosecution to present the informant does not vitiate its cause as the latter's testimony is not indispensable to a successful prosecution for drug-pushing, since his testimony would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug.[46] Failure of the prosecution to produce the informant in court is of no moment, especially when he is not even the best witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust operation has indeed been conducted.[47] Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police. It is well-settled that except when the accused vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to falsely testify against the accused, or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness accounts.[48] | |||||
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2007-03-09 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The trial court thus correctly rejected the defense of hulidap. Indeed, courts generally view with disfavor this defense, which is commonly raised in drug cases, it being easy to concoct and difficult to prove.[64] | |||||
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2004-05-25 |
VITUG, J. |
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| Appellant's argument that a surveillance or a test buy should have first been conducted deserves scant consideration. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it is enough to show that - (1) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused has freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.[11] Neither a prior surveillance of the suspected offender[12] nor the presentation of the informant would be an indispensable requirement to the successful prosecution of a drug case.[13] | |||||
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2004-02-17 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The Court accords the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses the highest degree of respect. The Court will not disturb on appeal such findings unless the trial court overlooked substantial facts which could have affected the result of the case.[10] After a careful review of the entire records, we do not find any such oversight by the trial court. | |||||
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2000-02-18 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Accused-appellant's attempt to discredit ROSALIE is unconvincing. The assessment of credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the trial court. It is well established in this jurisdiction that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great respect unless the court a quo overlooked substantial facts and circumstances which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case.[11] The evaluation or assessment made by the trial court acquires greater significance in rape cases because from the nature of the offense the only evidence that can oftentimes be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant's testimony.[12] We find no cogent and legal basis to disturb the finding of the trial court upholding the credibility of the complainant ROSALIE who "despite hard questions of the court, to test and ascertain her credibility of viewing the incident, clearly stood firm on what happened."[13] | |||||
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2000-02-17 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| We agree with the trial court, however, that most of these points refer to trivial matters that have no bearing on the elements of the crime. First, these are peripheral matters that do not detract from what has been established by the evidence for the prosecution. Hence, we have consistently held that the prior surveillance of the suspected offender[32] and the presentation of the informant[33] and the buy-bust money[34] are not indispensable to the prosecution of drug cases. | |||||
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2000-02-08 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| It is well established in this jurisdiction that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great respect unless the court a quo overlooked substantial facts and circumstances which, if considered, would materially affect the result of he case.[9] We find no reason to depart from this rule in the present case. | |||||