This case has been cited 10 times or more.
2009-06-18 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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The ruling of the Court of Appeals, based on the abovementioned findings of fact, is upheld by this Court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law. The findings of facts of the latter are conclusive for it is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh such evidence all over again.[34] Our jurisdiction is in principle limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the Court of Appeals. Factual findings of courts, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive on this Court unless these findings are not supported by the evidence on record.[35] | |||||
2008-12-10 |
TINGA, J. |
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document is to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings in the same form it was when the loss or destruction occurred.[39] Thus, before any reconstitution may be made, there should be proof that the title sought to be reconstituted had actually existed. In the present case, while there appears to be separate titles to the three (3) lots, there is no indication that a single title (TCT) covering all the lots exists, save for the heirs' assertion. This being the case, it was error for both the trial court and the Court of Appeals to grant the petition for reconstitution. | |||||
2006-06-30 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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All told, the ascertainment of good faith, or lack of it, and the determination of whether due diligence and prudence were exercised or not, are questions of fact. And while settled is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts[24] and the general rule is that the determination of whether or not a buyer or mortgagee is in good faith is generally outside the province of this Court to determine in a petition for review,[25] in Gabriel v. Spouses Mabanta we said that "[t]his rule, however, is not an iron-clad rule. In Floro v. Llenado we enumerated the various exceptions and one which finds application to the present case is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court."[26] Thus, in Clemente v. Razo we held that "the issue of whether or not one is an innocent purchaser for value is a question of fact which, as a rule, is not for this Court to determine. In the same breath, however, there are recognized exceptions to such rule, not the least of which is when, as in this case, the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to that of the trial court."[27] | |||||
2005-01-17 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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At the outset, it bears stressing that in a petition for review on certiorari, the scope of this Court's judicial review of decisions of the Court of Appeals is generally confined only to errors of law,[21] questions of fact are not entertained.[22] Thus, only questions of law may be brought by the parties and passed upon by this Court in the exercise of its power to review.[23] Also, judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its determination.[24] | |||||
2004-09-27 |
TINGA, J. |
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Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case.[22] Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.[23] | |||||
2003-03-26 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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Settled is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.[11] This rule, however, is not an iron-clad rule.[12] In Floro vs. Llenado,[13] we enumerated the various exceptions and one which finds application to the present case is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. | |||||
2001-03-06 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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Finally, the parties must not lose sight of the nature of judicial reconstitution proceedings, which denote a "restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document is to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred."[12] We emphasize that these actions do "not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Possession of a lost certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property."[13] | |||||
2000-01-31 |
PARDO, J. |
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The Court of Appeals held that the documents submitted were dubious in character and could not be proper sources of reconstitution of OCT No. 632. This is a factual finding that we cannot review in this review on certiorari.[25] | |||||
2000-01-25 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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Findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on the Supreme Court which is not a trier of facts; and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. However, this rule is not without exception. If there is a showing that the findings of facts complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, this Court must discard such erroneous finding.[23] We find that the exception applies in the case at bench. |