This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-08-17 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The injunctive writ issued by the RTC was meant to protect the petitioner's right to stay in office as President. Given that the lifetime of the writ of preliminary injunction was co-extensive with the duration of the act sought to be prohibited,[15] this injunctive relief already became moot in the face of the admission by the petitioner himself, through his affidavit,[16] that his term of office premised on his alleged five-year tenure as President had lasted only until December 2005. In short, the injunctive writ granted by the RTC had expired upon the end of the term of office (as posited by him). | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Petitioners did not allege or prove that after their tender of payment was refused by respondents, they attempted or pursued consignation of the payment with the proper court. Their tender of payment not having been followed by a valid consignation, it produced no effect whatsoever, least of all the extinguishment of the loan obligation. Therefore, the first issue of the validity or invalidity of their tender of payment is completely moot and academic, for either way the discussion will go, it will lead to no other conclusion but that, without an accompanying valid consignation, the tender of payment did not result in the payment and extinguishment of the loan obligation. The Court cannot take cognizance of such a purely hypothetical issue.[43] | |||||
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2008-10-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato[8] and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.[9] Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.[10] | |||||
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2006-04-19 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| It is settled that actual damages or compensatory damages may be awarded for breach of contracts. Actual damages are primarily intended to simply make good or replace the loss covered by said breach.[67] They cannot be presumed. Even if petitioner had admitted to having breached the Undertaking, respondent must still prove that it suffered damages and the amount thereof.[68] In determining the amount of actual damages, the Court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of losses.[69] The benefit to be derived from a contract which one of the parties has absolutely failed to perform is of necessity to some extent a matter of speculation of the injured party. | |||||
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2004-01-15 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The issue on improper execution of the penalty consisting of petitioners' suspension is moot. There is sufficient basis for the penalty, which we sustain. Considering the fact that the petitioners are indeed liable for simple misconduct, and that they have served out the penalty as affirmed by TUP Office Order No. 452, s.2000,[14] this Court is constrained from considering an issue that has become academic.[15] Suffice it to stress that no temporary restraining order (TRO) has been issued by this Court, while the appellate court itself had lifted the TRO it issued earlier, paving the way for compliance with the suspension order. As a general rule, courts should not take cognizance of moot and academic questions.[16] | |||||