This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2010-09-27 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| In G & S Transport,[32] the Court awarded separation pay equivalent to one month salary per year of service considering that 17 years had passed from the time when the striking employees were refused reinstatement. In Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC,[33] the Court allowed separation pay equivalent to one month salary per year of service considering that eight years had elapsed since the employees had staged their illegal strike. | |||||
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2008-04-16 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human struggle for a decent existence. It is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise.[59] | |||||
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2007-10-19 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| Likewise, we are not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of the factual findings of the NLRC in the absence of clear showing that these were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis.[45] In the case at bench, the Union failed to convince us that the NLRC findings that the Union officials instigated, led, and knowingly participated in the series of illegal strikes are not reinforced by substantial evidence. Verily, said findings have to be maintained and upheld. We reiterate, as a reminder to labor leaders, the rule that "[u]nion officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law."[46] Contrarily, if the "officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted authorities, their dismissal from the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts."[47] | |||||
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2007-10-19 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR, the court ruled "Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be 'substantial.' Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion."[55] (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
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2007-09-13 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The above-quoted rule enunciates reinstatement as the standard relief. However, in this case, seventeen (17) years have elapsed since respondents were illegally dismissed. In Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC [44], where more than eight (8) years have passed since the petitioners therein staged an illegal strike and were found to have been unlawfully terminated, an award of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, was deemed more practical and appropriate to all the parties concerned. We adopt the same tack in this case. | |||||
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2007-06-22 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| x x x Thus in Association of Independent Union in the Philippines vs. NLRC,[41] we held that the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore, limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation in an illegal strike is in order. Of the same tenor, albeit formulated a bit differently is our holding in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs. NLRC.[42] (Emphasis supplied.) In the case at bar, we do not find any reason to deviate from our rulings in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. and Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. It bears emphasis that the strike staged by the Union in the instant case was illegal for its procedural infirmities and for defiance of the Secretary's assumption order. The CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter were unanimous in finding that bad faith existed in the conduct of the subject strike. The relevant portion of the CA Decision states:x x x We cannot go to the extent of ascribing good faith to the means taken in conducting the strike. The requirement of the law is simple, that is 1. Give a Notice of Strike; 2. Observe the cooling period; 3. Observe the mandatory seven day strike ban; 3. If the act is union busting, then the union may strike doing away with the cooling-off period, subject only to the seven-day strike ban. To be lawful, a strike must simply have a lawful purpose and should be executed through lawful means. Here, the union cannot claim good faith in the conduct of the strike because, as can be gleaned from the findings of the Labor Arbiter, this was an extensively coordinated strike having been conducted all through out the offices of PILTEL all over the country. Evidently, the strike was planned. Verily, they cannot now come to court hiding behind the shield of "good faith." Be that as it may, petitioners claim good faith only in so far as their grounds for the strike but not on the conduct of the strike. Consequently, they still had to comply with the procedural requirements for a strike, which, in this case, they failed to do so.[43] Thus, in imposing the penalty of dismissal, the NLRC correctly held: | |||||
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2006-09-19 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| " Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status" (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Under the immediately quoted provision, an ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have lost his employment status by mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. While the University adduced photographs[36] showing strikers picketing outside the university premises, it failed to identify who they were. It thus failed to meet the "substantiality of evidence test" [37] applicable in dismissal cases. | |||||
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2006-07-17 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| What is more, the strike had been attended by the widespread commission of prohibited acts. Well-settled is the rule that even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal.[23] Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall:a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or | |||||
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2004-02-24 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| With respect to union officers, however, there is no dispute they could be dismissed for participating in an illegal strike. Union officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law.[21] Nonetheless, as in other termination cases, union officers must be given the required notices for terminating an employment, i.e., notice of hearing to enable them to present their side, and notice of termination, should their explanation prove unsatisfactory. Nothing in Article 264 of the Labor Code authorizes an immediate dismissal of a union officer for participating in an illegal strike. The act of dismissal is not intended to happen ipso facto but rather as an option that can be exercised by the employer and after compliance with the notice requirements for terminating an employee. In this case, petitioners did not give the required notices to the union officers. | |||||
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2004-02-05 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| …Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status… (Emphasis ours) Thus, while a union officer can be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike, an ordinary striking employee, like petitioners herein, must have participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike (underscoring supplied). There must be proof that they committed illegal acts during the strike.[14] But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice. | |||||