This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2003-08-07 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The Information alleged that appellant was the stepfather of the victim. This was inaccurate. The word "step", when used as prefix in conjunction with a degree of kinship, is repugnant to blood relationship and is indicative of a relationship by affinity.[28] Since appellant and the victim's mother were not married, no such relationship by affinity existed between appellant and the victim. The records indicate that the victim's mother, Lorna, and the appellant were "live-in partners," the former, in fact, lawfully married to Charlie Balandra, the victim's father. A stepfather-stepdaughter relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship, i.e., the appellant should have been legally married to Lorna, the victim's mother. A stepfather is the husband of one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring.[29] A stepdaughter is a daughter of one's spouse by previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses by a former marriage.[30] | |||||
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2003-06-26 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The relationship between a stepfather and a stepdaughter assumes the existence of a legitimate relationship, that is, the stepfather should be legally married to the stepdaughter's mother.[37] In contrast, a common-law husband is not legally married to his common-law wife. If such common-law wife has a daughter by another man, the daughter is not a stepdaughter of the common-law husband.[38] A common-law husband is subject to punishment by death if he commits rape[39] against his common-law wife's daughter by another man. However, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the common-law husband if the relationship alleged in the information is that of a stepfather and stepdaughter, and what is proven is the relationship between a common-law husband and the daughter of his common-law wife by another man.[40] | |||||
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2002-05-28 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| The prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the precise degree of culpability of the accused. It must demonstrate in sufficient detail the manner by which the crime was perpetrated. Certainly, the testimony of the victim to the effect that the accused repeatedly poked her vagina and that she felt pain as a consequence thereof, would not be enough to warrant the conclusion that a consummated rape had indeed been committed. The quantum of evidence in criminal cases requires more than that. Prior to Francisco, we ruled in People v. Tolentino[68] that the testimony, "binundul-bundol ang kanyang ari," did not conclusively prove that rape was committed to the exclusion of other offenses and further held that "this testimony is subject to different interpretations and will not lead to the conclusion that [the accused's] intent was to have carnal knowledge of her." No consummated rape took place in People v. Arce[69] on account of the victim's claim that the accused "attempted to touch her vagina with his penis or 'idinidikit yung ari niya.'" In these cases where the victim herself, as Lenie in the instant case, failed to state for the record that there was insertion of the penis into her vagina, rape was deemed not to have been committed. Together with the absolutely non-incriminating medical certificate, which is the only corroborative evidence available, the likelihood for the consummation of rape in the instant case was nil. In People v. Campuhan[70] we held - | |||||
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2002-02-15 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| A careful reading of the testimony of Gemmalyn fails to convince us that the rape was consummated. Gemmalyn did not declare positively that there was the slightest penetration necessary to consummate rape. On the contrary, she categorically stated that accused-appellant was not able to insert his penis into her private part because she was moving away her hips x x x x Furthermore, in People v. Dimapilis[28] this Court refused to convict the accused for consummated rape on the basis of the victim's testimony that she felt the accused's penis pressed (in the instant case "diniin") against her vagina as he tried to insert it into her private organ. People v. Tolentino[29] also ruled as an inadequate basis to conclude the consummation of the forced sexual act the testimony of the victim picturing the penis as merely "binubundul-bundol" (which is synonymous with "dikit" or "diin" in signifying only an epidermal contact) vis-a-vis her vagina - | |||||
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2001-12-19 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The defense presented in evidence the medical certificate (Exh. "1") issued by Dr. Joselyn Baeyens of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital, the authenticity of which was admitted by the prosecution.[17] The certificate stated that Lorlyn was examined on March 23, 1998 and that no laceration or abrasion was found in her hymen and that she tested negative for spermatozoa.[18] | |||||
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2000-11-29 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| On the other hand, based on our current rulings, the award of P30,000.00 as moral damages should be increased to P50,000.00 irrespective of proof thereof.[42] In addition, the victim is entitled to the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity which must be given even if there is neither allegation nor evidence presented as basis therefor.[43] | |||||
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2000-01-31 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Appellant now desperately anchors his appeal on the lack of physical evidence of rape on the body of the victim. But his arguments are far from convincing. First, it is well-settled that rupture of the hymen or vaginal lacerations are not necessary for rape to be consummated.[16] Second, a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of a rape victim.[17] Insofar as the evidentiary weight of the medical examination is concerned, we have already ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction in rape.[18] What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible,[19] and this we find here to be the case. Moreover, Dr. Tebangin himself clarified that since he examined the victim some fourteen (14) days after the incident, it is possible that during examination, there was no longer any evidence of the injuries which she might have sustained as a result of the rape.[20] | |||||
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2000-01-28 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Note also that the allegation in the separate Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 4591-0 and 4607-0, abovecited, that the victim is appellant's stepdaughter is incorrect. Private complainant is not appellant's stepdaughter. A stepdaughter is the daughter of one's spouse by a previous marriage, or the daughter of one of the spouses by a previous marriage.[33] Appellant is not legally married to complainant's mother. Appellant and the victim's mother admit only to a common-law relationship. This Court has ruled that the circumstances under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, which mandates the imposition of the death penalty, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances. This Court can not ignore erroneous reference to the victim as the "step-daughter" of appellant. For that error might lead to the further error of considering the accused as "step-parent" under Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 7659 as a qualifying circumstance, which cannot be proved unless properly alleged in the information.[34] | |||||